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CHAPTER I 
IN!RODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
How could a darn with a 4" high and 75' long horizontal crack exist for 
years in this time of environmental regulation and awareness? Some rudimentary 
research into the history of the Lake Frances Darn, located in Oklahoma, showed 
that not only had the crack existed for years, but that over 14 years ago, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers had found the dam to be unsafe. Basic repairs were 
never made. On May 3, 1990 a 75' portion of the darn was swept away by 
floodwaters. Several water management entities in Oklahoma are responsible for 
small darns, such as the Lake Frances Darn. By using institutional arrangement 
analysis, an explanation of how this disrepair could continue will be offered. 
Justification of the Study 
The creation and jurisdiction of many entities within the water resource 
management institutions of Oklahoma are controlled by law. In Tobin, et al, the 
geographic approach to legal system analysis is recognized and encouraged. 
Understanding the way a water management institution functions is critical to 
understanding the way water is used, and those authors conclude that geographers 
need to do more research in the area of legal-system analysis (1989, 131). 
Peter Taylor states in "Political Geography: Research Agendas for the 1980s," 
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"It is important to develop methodologies that can integrate theories of the state 
with models of government action so that public policy decisions can be set within 
a broader theoretical framework (1982, 11)." 
2 
A genuine need exists for a detailed understanding of the processes of 
decision-making and the formulation of public policy. The values, attitudes, and 
perceptions of decision-makers, the relative importance of different actors such as 
professional experts and elected representatives, all warrant the attention of political 
geographers (Taylor 1982, 9). O'Riordan states that new institutional reforms 
should be regarded with top priority in resource management (1971). 
The field of institutional arrangement studies is still a relatively young one. 
Individual case studies are still being used to test frameworks for analysis and 
criteria for evaluation in resource management. A variety of aspects exist to study, 
and as a result, not a large enough body of literature has accumulated yet to 
suggest one model or one panacea for every institutional crisis. For example, 
within water management, the existing institutions at the local, state, or federal 
level could be examined. The institutions at each scale could be studied to see how 
they function in relation to a particular interest, such as water quality, dam 
management, water consumption, or recreation. Multiple aspects of water 
management could also be studied for a specific entity. The scope of possibilities is 
wide. So, although analysis of a single case study will rarely be sufficient for a full 
inquiry, a large number of case studies can suggest fundamental relationships 
(Kennedy 1979; Yin 1981). This case study will add to the growing body of 
institutional research. 
The scope of most institutional studies, thus far, has been large. In order to 
be of manageable size for a thesis, an analysis of a small-scale conflict was chosen 
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to test a previously developed framework and criteria. Lyle E. Craine's 1969 model 
was originally used to examine the institutional arrangements in England and 
Wales. Therefore, at the outset, some minor changes were needed to adjust this 
model to apply to the American system. Craine acknowledges this need in the 
introduction to his book. 
Perhaps one of the most prevalent difficulties in comparing institutional 
arrangement studies is that most do not use the same definition of institution, or 
the same criteria for analysis. This view is shared by Mitchell (1979, 243). Several 
researchers have addressed the matter of varying definitions of institution (Wengert 
1972 and 1973; Trock 1971; Mitchell 1979). Wengert found that the definition varied 
depending on the discipline using it. For example, lawyers applied the term to 
certain aspects of the legal system, sociologists generally could not agree on a 
definition, and federal agencies commonly used the word institution as a surrogate 
for organization (1973, 513). Trock states that institutions provide a framework or 
environment, at whatever level of social grouping, within which our lives are 
regulated. He further states that an institution would involve habits and cultural 
organizations, traditions, customs, laws and legal requirements (1971, 3). This 
definition is also used by Kaynor and Howards (1971). 
The primary consideration of this study was to choose a previous study 
whose definition and criteria are applicable. In this study, 
"institutional arrangements" refers to a definable system of public decision 
making, one that includes specific organizational entities and governmental 
jurisdictions, but transcends conventional emphasis upon definition of 
agency structure, per se. In addition to being concerned with component 
organizational entities, the term "institutions" suggests special attention to 
the configuration of various relationships: 
(1) established by law between individuals and government; 
(2) involved in economic transactions among individuals and groups; 
(3) developed to articulate legal, financial and administrative relationships 
among public agendes; and 
(4) motivated by social-psychological stimuli among groups and 
individuals. 
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Spedfic relationships falling in any or all of these four categories, 
constrained and shaped by the natural and social environment, weave a web 
which describes the institutional system for dedsion making. Thus, 
institutional studies focus on the linkages that tie authority and action 
centers together in a public decision making system, which is responsive to 
the environment within which it must operate (Craine 1971, 522). 
Statement of the Problem 
Recent political change and public awareness, in the realm of water 
management, has dealt with point source and nonpoint source pollution control, as 
well as preservation and protection of wetlands. However, the more fundamental 
concern is that there are laws in effect today already governing all phases of water 
management. Are they working effectively? The current institutional arrangements 
need to be examined and changes suggested to insure proper implementation of 
any new or existing legislation. 
Wherever people develop a relationship with others, an institution evolved 
to manage and protect that relationship, thus minimizing the frictions or conflicts 
that might arise from it. Institutional problems arise primarily because some 
guidance is looked for, or some change is proposed, that is contrary to the purpose 
of that institution. Such efforts cannot succeed until the framework within which 
that activity is to take place is changed (Trock 1971). 
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The institutional arrangements now in place within Oklahoma, concerning 
dam management, are not working. Dam disrepair for so many years is evidence 
of this. By using the case study of the Lake Frances Dam, and chronologically 
studying the institutional arrangements over the past 70 years, the point at which 
the breakdown in management occurred can be determined. There have been three 
controversies concerning Lake Frances over the years; water quality, water rights, 
and dam safety. Although these aspects have overlapped at times, this study will 
primarily explore the dam safety issue. Craine's model and criteria will be used to 
analyze the legal, administrative and financial aspects of the institutional 
arrangements pertaining to Lake Frances. 
Description of the Study Area 
In Oklahoma, there are two major river basins, the Red and the Arkansas. 
The Arkansas River Basin contains five of the state's six scenic rivers, one of which 
is the Illinois. The source of the Illinois River is in the Boston Mountains of 
Washington County, Arkansas. As shown in Figure 1, the river enters Oklahoma in 
Adair County, and after a slight northwestward tum into Delaware County, flows 
southwesterly through Cherokee and Sequoyah Counties before its confluence with 
the Arkansas River, completing its 109 mile stretch through eastern Oklahoma. 
The Lake Frances Dam is located just inside Oklahoma on the lllinois River 
in Section 17, T19N, R25E (see Figure 2). The 1990 OWRB Water Atlas notes it to 
have a capacity of 2,280 acre feet with a surface area of 562 acres, 4 miles of 
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shoreline, and lists the primary use as water supply and recreation for the town of 
Siloam Springs, AR (15). 
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The history of the lake began in the 1920s when James W. Sloan bought 800 
acres of land, then known as Forest Park, along the Illinois River. A 70-acre lake 
existed on the property. Sloan decided to expand the lake for recreational purposes 
in 1931. The newly created lake was christened on Memorial Day, May 30, 1931, 
and was named after Sloan's daughter Frances. The original planning and design 
of the Lake Frances Dam, which included a small hydroelectric plant, was by Victor 
H. Cochrane, a consulting engineer from Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
The lake's peak years of popularity were between 1931 and 1941, when 
motorboat races, canoeing, fishing, and parties at the resort were commonplace. 
The resort was impressive with swank cabins and cottages nearby, and drew in 
vacationers from Tulsa, Dallas, Kansas City, and New Orleans. Its success can be 
attributed to the lack of other large reservoirs in eastern Oklahoma. Lakes 
Tenkiller, Grand, or Texoma were yet to be built. 
Today, the resort is in a serious state of disrepair, although it is still being 
operated. Fishing activities still go on, even though the Lake level has fallen to less 
than two feet in most places. Lake Frances will not likely enjoy the prosperity of 
those early years again. 
General Nature of Dams 
As a prelude to the actual case, a brief history of dams and their general 
nature would serve to place the scope of this study in perspective. 
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Early Dam Development 
The Sadd el-Kafara the oldest known dam, whose ruins may still be seen 
today, is located near Helwan, approximately 20 miles south of Cairo, Egypt. It 
was built during the Third or Fourth Dynasty, had a crest length of 348', a base 
length of 265', and a maximum height of 37' above the bed of the valley (Smith 
1972, 1). As civilization progressed to the point that a ruler had sizable labor forces 
available, more dams and irrigation works could be built (Smith 1972, 15). Early 
projects of this size were obviously only undertaken by rulers with substantial 
power. 
Dams were used in warfare as early as 689 B.C., when Babylon was attacked 
and destroyed by the Assyrian King Sennacherib. After sacking the city, he 
dammed the Euphrates River, built up a large reservoir and then destroyed the 
dam. The resulting flood completed the destruction of Babylon (Smith 1972, 9). 
Strabo, a well-known Greek geographer of the first century B.C., believed 
the Persians used dams on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as defense against 
Alexander. Dam-based irrigation was used on the same rivers as early as the 
fourth century B.C. (Smith 1972, 14). 
Construction materials of those ancient dams were earth, wood, and 
masonry. Primary purposes were for agriculture, a potable water supply, canal 
systems, and hydraulic power for mining or mills. Causes of dam failure were, and 
still are, poor engineering and natural siltation. 
Dam failures had a sizable effect on early populations in some cases. For 
example, in 1545 in Bolivia, a prosperous location for silver mines existed at Potosi. 
It's total population was up to 160,000 at one time. To serve the mining industry 
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Potosi had a dam system of 32 structures. One dam failure wiped out more than 
half of the mills, and they were never rebuilt. The miners, being extremely 
superstitious, considered the accident to be of divine intervention, and that it was a 
retribution to be heeded. Of the 32 dams, 24 are still in service for a population of 
45,000 (Smith 1972, 134-7). 
Dam Development in the United States 
Dam building of notable size started in the mid-18th century in the United 
States. Diversion dams of rubble masonry set in hydraulic mortar were built in San 
Antonio, Texas. Timber dams were more common in New England, where they 
were used to power grist mills, saw mills, and powder mills. Some were even used 
for tidal power plants, an idea that is being re-explored today. Most of these dams 
were made of wood, earth, or stone. Large water supply dams did not get their 
start until the early 1800s. One of the earliest ones was built in 1820 on the 
Schuylkill River by the city of Philadelphia. This was also one of the earliest dual-
purpose dams, providing a water source for navigation locks at one end, and water-
powered supply pumps at the other (Smith 1972, 183). 
The era of canal development began in the early 1800s. The Rideau Canal, 
linking Ottawa to Kingston, was the largest system, requiring 52 dams and taking 6 
years to construct. Many of these early dams were simple earthen structures. The 
canal system was quickly replaced by the development of the railroad system, so 
subsequently, many canal dams have been used for fishing, hydroelectric power, 
and as metropolitan water supply reservoirs. 
As populations expanded in the nation's cities, transportation systems and 
other public utilities had to be centralized as well. Dams then became important 
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for creating large water supply reservoirs for people and industry (Smith 1972, 176-
182). Reservoir dams are still being built today. 
As noted earlier with the Potosi story, dams can affect population 
distributions. In addition to increasing urban populations, the railroads transported 
greater numbers of settlers to the West. As the cities of the arid West developed, 
dam building became crucial to survivaL 
The West has millions settled where nature, left alone, would have 
supported thousands at best. Reisner notes that everything in the West depends 
upon the manipulation of water - capturing it behind dams, storing it and 
rerouting it over hundreds of miles. Few free flowing rivers remain in the West, 
and despite all these heroic efforts, and billions of dollars, all we have managed to 
do is turn a Missouri-sized section green (1986, 2-5). 
Of supreme significance to the prolific dam building movement was the 
development of electro-magnetism, the only form of energy in a ready-to-use state 
that can be transmitted over long distances. By the end of the 19th century, three 
separate technologies were joined: dams, water turbines, and electric generators 
(Smith 1972, 216). 
Masonry and mortar replaced timber and earth dams as the construction 
materials of choice. The first all-concrete dam was built in 1887-89 in San Mateo, 
California, and survived the 1906 earthquake. In 1899-1900, the Upper Otay dam 
was built of concrete with wire reinforcement as water supply to San Diego (Smith 
1972, 210-12). 
Concerning construction methods, most major dams were straight gravity or 
multiple arch. The first arch dam in the U.S. was built in Bear Valley in 1884. It 
was replaced by a multiple arch dam in 1910 only because of the need for more 
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water. It still exists today under water (Smith 1972, 192-208). 
In the U.S., the construction of major dams like the Hoover or Grand Coulee 
was financed largely by the government as public works projects. Presently over 
50,000 major dams exist in the U.S. (Reisner 1986, 14). Irrigation schemes, dams, 
and canals were successful in appeasing voters by providing jobs, and stimulating 
economic opportunity (O'Riordan 1971, 23). Shanks reports that federal financial 
aid and technical assistance in planning and construction have subsidized many of 
the 2.5 million small dams less than 25' high or with a capacity of less than 50 acre 
feet of water (1981, 109). 
During the boom-time in dam building history (early 1900s), techniques in 
construction improved slowly. Even today, Congressionally authorized projects are 
outdated before their planned life span is over, due to silting or construction design 
errors. Modification or rebuilding can cost more than the initial construction; yet 
this is not considered in the cost-benefit analysis. Construction costs are 
underestimated and maintenance and repair are virtually ignored (Shanks 1981, 
117). 
It was Shanks' opinion that such underestimations allow for the continual 
perpetuation of many federal and state agencies, which does not necessarily 
provide for the best darn management. Ideally, Shanks suggests separating each 
project justification from the agency responsible for its construction and 
management. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget would be well-suited to 
make initial evaluations. Self-interest would not be a factor this way (1981, 121-
122). 
In addition to large scale dam projects, construction of smaller earthen dams 
also increased during this time. Powerful earth moving machines were developed, 
allowing management of large volumes of soil. Other equipment was developed 
and used to move rocks, and by the turn of the century, rock-filled darns were 
becoming advanced enough to warrant building the 328' Salt Springs Darn in 
California. Rock-filled darn construction has had a good success rate (Smith 1972, 
226). 
Despite all of the advances in construction and technologies, darn failures 
are common. The causes of most failures are insufficient spillway capacity, 
incorrect laying of pipe outlets, and slips in the embankments themselves (Smith 
1972, 212). The development of stress analysis now prevents most potentially 
disastrous darn failures. 
Darn Development in Oklahoma 
Many lakes in Oklahoma, including Lake Frances, were created by federal 
and state agencies during the dam-building boom period of the 1930s and 1940s. 
Early lakes in Oklahoma were developed by several agencies. The Civilian 
Conservation Corps, Works Progress Administration, Soil Conservation Service 
(Lake Carl Blackwell, 1937), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Great Salt Plains 
Reservoir, 1941; Fort Supply Reservoir, 1942), Oklahoma Water Resources Board 
(Lake Murray, 1937), and the Grand River Darn Authority (Grand Lake 0' the 
Cherokees, 1940), were the primary developers. The 440 mile McClellan-Kerr 
Arkansas River Navigation System was completed in 1971 (OWRB 1984, 8-9). 
However, most of the major reservoir construction occurred in the quarter century 
since 1959. Primary uses for the major reservoirs are navigation, flood control, 
irrigation, recreation, municipal and industrial water supply, and hydropower 
(OWRB 1984, 10). 
13 
14 
Small darns of earth and rock fill are plentiful in Oklahoma. Although 
model analyses are available to test for structural soundness, total or partial darn 
failures are still common. The four primary causes of failure are: the darn is 
overtopped by a flood, seepage under the darn undermines it, seepage through an 
embankment washes it away, or the slopes of the embankment slip and wash away 
(Smith 1972, 225}. 
Literature Review 
Institutional arrangement studies are, by nature, highly interdisciplinary. 
For example, to complete a research project at the scale of a large river basin, it 
would require, at a minimum, the expertise of geographers, economists, geologists, 
civil engineers, biologists, archeologists, and political scientists. Therefore, although 
no institutional arrangement studies pertaining to a privately-owned darn have 
been done, pertinent literature in the disciplines of agricultural economics, political 
geography, law, and resource planning and development is available. Some 
scholars have developed models, frameworks for analysis, and criteria for 
evaluation. These provide useful models for evaluating institutional and resource 
problems. Case studies which illustrate this may eventually lead to theory 
formation. Theories have to be developed to allow for predicted effects of policy 
decisions on human-environment relations (Ernel and Peet 1989). Such models will 
be evaluated below in order to determine the one most appropriate for this study. 
Although most of these models look at water management institutions in general, 
rather than darns alone, they provide the necessary background for this study. 
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Institutional Arrangement Studies 
Geographers have contributed substantially to the body of literature devoted 
to institutional arrangement studies concerning many aspects of water resources 
management. 
At the forefront of the field of geographers who have studied institutional 
arrangements stands Bruce Mitchell. In Geography and Resource Analysis, he 
de~otes an entire chapter to the subject (1979). Institutional arrangement studies 
are strongly interdisciplinary. The wide range of literature researched for this thesis 
would support the merit of the idea. These studies are particularly suitable for 
geographers to be involved with, since this discipline traditionally seeks to 
understand spatial allocation of resources, the complexity of regions, or, the 
relationship between humanity and the environment (Mitchell 1979, 242). In the 
subfield of water management, Mitchell briefly describes the study done on the 
Great Lakes basin. The researchers discovered that the most "fundamental barrier 
to successful resource management was the lack of a satisfactory institutional 
structure." A framework for analysis was developed using management functions 
and criteria pertinent to the Great Lakes. The framework used in this case is 
particularly useful for analyzing arrangements of a large scale, not for less 
complicated arrangements, such as the one in Oklahoma (1979, 242). 
Several other geographers have completed institutional arrangement studies 
of various aspects in water management. Examples include water pollution control 
(Grima 19Bn regional water management (Kromm 1985; Wescoat, 1986; Day 1986), 
water rights (Wescoat, 1986; Templer 1973), institutional change process (Arnett, 
Clark, and Gurnell 1984), and location of institutions (Gottmann, ed. 1980). 
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Grima's article focuses on the articulation of policies in the interface between 
economic production and water quality (1981). Kromm, like Craine, examines 
institutions in England and Wales. He identifies the advantages and disadvantages 
of autonomous regional districts as a means of administrating the nation's water 
resources. In addition, he notes the merits of regional water management based on 
watersheds (1985). 
Wescoat (1986) studies the impact of the Colorado River Basin Salinity 
Control Act of 1974. After the act was passed, a federally sponsored research team 
sought to identify institutional barriers to salinity control. Wescoat found that the 
team had neglected two of the most politically sensitive problems, one of which is 
the water rights implications of salinity control projects. For analysis of water 
rights, Wescoat uses a generalized model of western water law to illustrate the 
relationships between salinity control and water allocation patterns. In reference to 
institutional involvement, Wescoat was very thorough in describing institutional 
involvement, but no model was used to analyze the various entities comprising the 
water management institution. However, institutional analysis was not the primary 
purpose of his research. 
Resource Planning and Development 
Lyle Craine is a Professor of Resource Planning and Conservation at the 
University of Michigan. Craine researched the water management institutions of 
England. In Water Management Innovations in England, 1%9, he developed a 
model specifically for analyzing the governmental institutions involved, defining 
each criterion, which, as noted earlier by Mitchell, is one of the deficiencies of many 
institutional studies. In addition to defining the criteria, he also defined specifically 
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how to apply them, and then followed through with his own case study. Craine's 
framework for analysis and criteria are detailed in Chapter II of this study. 
Trock, from the Water Resources Institute, conducted a study of the 
institutional factors influencing water development in Texas. The study is 
extremely broad, encompassing the entire state, and not only examines the 
institutional arrangements regarding water import, transport, and distribution, but 
also examines the impacts of institutions on land and water use in a local area, the 
lower Rio Grande (1971, 2). The model used for the analysis in the lower Rio 
Grande Valley is one depicting optimum resource use in crop production, which is 
the primary outcome needed for water management (1971, 17). The scope in either 
portion of the study is wider ranging, and the production outcomes different than 
what is needed for the purpose of the Lake Frances Dam case study. 
Other authors in the realm of water resources planning are Fernie and 
Pitkethly, 1985, who include a chapter on water management. They discuss 
management trends and elaborate on Sewell's five concepts of water management, 
which follow Gilbert White's suggestions. Although that book offers good 
background reading to the subject at hand, no framework for analysis of existing 
institutional arrangements was included. 
Paul Hughes used a combination of five different institutional arrangement 
studies to analyze some alternative institutional arrangements for a study in the 
Washington Metropolitan Area (1971). In Appendix A of his book he outlines the 
criteria used by each of the five studies he consulted. The studies he used included 
Craine's, as well as a Syracuse University Study, the Water Resources Council 
Study, a Kneese and Bower Study, and finally a paper by Edwin T. Haefele. 
Hughes' study is an excellent example of identifying and adopting the institutional 
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criteria needed for a specific problem. For the purpose of this study, however, the 
elaborate merging of these models was not necessary. Again, the scope of this 
study is small, and Craine's model and criteria alone are sufficient. 
Kaynor and Howards identify some constraints within the Massachusetts 
water resource institution by studying the decision-making process in place (1971). 
In their paper, they discussed constraints within the economic system, the political 
system, and also some that were noninstitutional. Their findings indicated that, in 
this particular area of decision-making in Massachusetts, institutions were less 
important than other variables. Although their paper was only a portion of a larger 
study, the criteria for analyzing the various constraints was not clear, nor was the 
method for discerning the constraints they chose to review. As a result, the Kaynor 
and Howards study was useful in expanding knowledge of water resource 
problems in general, but none of it was directly useful in this case. 
Political Geography 
Political geographers have long combined the study of law with geography. 
As Matthews notes, this kind of study has roots as far back as Whittlesey's works 
in 1935 and 1939 (1984, 11). White's natural resource work began in the early 1940s 
and has continued prolifically to current times. Kasperson conducted a case study 
uniting politics and water resources in 1969. The body of literature in this area 
increased significantly in the 1970s, and continues to grow. Recent work in water 
resources geography continues a long tradition of broadening the discourse on 
human use of the environment. 
In 1984, Matthews developed some fundamental concepts concerning the 
science of studying water resources, geography, and law. He states that, "when 
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dealing with policy at different levels, an understanding of the legal system is 
essential in understanding the way water resources are used." He has developed a 
model to clarify this relationship between law, society, and resource use (1984, 11). 
Although the model does not deal specifically with institutional analysis, the 
concepts set forward in it were useful when searching through the maze of 
institutional arrangement literature. Many "informal actions" take place in this case 
study, and the problem of overlapping jurisdictions has been noted and included in 
the final model chosen. 
Agricultural Economics 
Kristjanson (1954) completed one of the earliest economic studies concerning 
water resources. His research was on the Missouri River Basin where a 
multiagency approach to river development was being used. After examining some 
of the specific conflicts involved in the development of the region, he then looked 
to the example of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A) for ideas to resolve the 
conflicts. One solution of an interstate Missouri River Basin Compact was being 
considered, with the "core" states being Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Colorado, Iowa, and Minnesota 
would also be able to ratify the compact. 
The TV A is continually monitored and accountable to Congress, the 
President and the public, and financial reports are routinely turned in to Congress. 
Federal-State-Local cooperation is utilized in most aspects of planning, and tax 
benefits are given to those whose land is taken for the TV A reservoirs. Each step in 
the management is accountable to a specific individual or agency, to alleviate the 
problem of "passing the buck." 
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The process used to analyze the Missouri River Basin works well on a 
regional scale, but not on small scale conflicts. Economical analysis was prevalent, 
but doesn't work for solving all conflicts. After describing all the conflicts in the 
Missouri River Basin and the TV A case study, the suggestions for change boiled 
down to four short paragraphs, with not enough specifics on exactly what to do. 
Suggestions were made such as, develop an administrative device adapted to the 
region, or place administrative authority with one or some group that can be held 
accountable for results. A framework or model was not used for analysis. 
Agricultural economists Bromley, Butcher, and Smith (1971) reviewed the 
1973 recommendations of the National Water Commission (NWC). After personal 
review of the document, it was understandable why they were surprised that the 
NWC did not address instream flow problems, such as the management of water 
quality and quantity. Furthermore, no flow management framework was given 
with which to test the recommendations (1971, 32). Thus, with the exception of the 
recommendation that river basin planning be put to use, few of their ideas are 
applicable to this case study, either in selecting a model for analysis or in making 
suggestions for institutional change. 
Institutional Involvement With Dams and Policy Changes 
The U.S. government has been involved in many dam building efforts over 
the years. Agendes have been created solely for the purpose of planning, 
constructing, and managing these dams. Legislation created some of the agendes, 
outlined their rules and regulations, and was designed to protect various aspects of 
water management, and thereby, dam management. 
Water law applies not only to federal and state entities, but also to local or 
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private ones as well, forming a hierarchy of overlapping administrative jurisdictions 
(Matthews 1984). These four scales have been recognized in the land use decision 
process (Platt 1976), and they also apply to dam management decisions, even with a 
small dam such as the Lake Frances Dam. This multilevel aspect must be 
considered and adopted into any institutional arrangement analysis, no matter what 
resource issue is being analyzed. In combination, these federal, state, local and 
private entities comprise the water management institutions of the United States. A 
brief discussion of the primary entities and policies of the United States follows. 
On June 17, 1902, the Reclamation Act became law to "reclaim the desert" 
and form the Bureau of Reclamation (43 U.S.C. § 371 et seq.). The Bureau was 
initially concerned with surveying, planning, and construction of irrigation projects 
in the western United States, but soon was the controlling authority behind 
hydroelectric development there as well. By 1910, the principle was established 
that electric power developed by the Bureau should be sold to the cities. The first 
darn built for this purpose was in 1911. The Roosevelt Dam, the largest masonry 
dam to that date at 284' high, created electric power that was sold to the city of 
Phoenix. Other noteworthy darns created for power generation are the Grand 
Coulee and Hoover Darns (Smith 1972, 226-27). 
The Federal Power Act of 1920 (16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c, as amended through 
1986) created the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which is authorized to 
issue licenses to construct, operate and maintain darns, conduits, reservoirs, and 
transmission lines to improve navigation and to develop power from any streams 
or other bodies of water over which it has jurisdiction. 
The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954 (16 U.S.C. §§ 
1001-1009, as amended through 1986) gives the Soil Conservation Service (SCS 
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hereafter), of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the authority to provide planning 
assistance and construction funding for local projects. Restrictions on these projects 
limit the size of the watershed to 250,000 acres or less; provide no single structure 
with more than 12,500 acre feet of flood water retention; provide no single structure 
with more than 25,000 acre-feet of total capacity; and requires Congressional 
approval of projects with costs greater than $5 million or with structures greater 
than 25,000 acre-feet. The original statute sought cooperation between the Federal 
Government, States, and municipalities to prevent flood damages. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps hereafter) is directed by Congress 
through Sec. 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. § 
403) to regulate all work or structures in or affecting the course, condition, or 
capacity of navigable waters of the United States. The intent of that law is to 
protect the navigable capacity of waters important to interstate commerce. The Act 
also requires the Corps to give "due regard" to wildlife conservation in planning 
federally authorized water resources projects, normally with input from the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (see below). Through Sec. 404 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) (33 U.S.C. § 1344), 
the Corps is directed to plan wetland areas as part of water development projects, 
and to regulate the discharges of dredged and fill material into all waters of the 
United States. Those waters include lakes, rivers, streams, mudflats, sandflats, 
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, and other natural 
ponds. The intent of that law is to protect waters of the United States from the 
indiscriminate discharge of material capable of causing pollution and to restore and 
maintain their chemical, physical, and biological integrity. Technically, materials 
used to construct darns qualify as fill material. 
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The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS hereafter), with the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, has many duties. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act of 1934 (16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667e) provides for the FWS to advise the Corps and 
other Federal agencies regarding effects of water development projects on fish and 
wildlife resources, and requires those agencies to consider FWS concerns. As 
noted above, the Corps must seek input from the FWS through the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1938 (33 U.S.C. § 540). The Endangered Spedes Act of 1973 (16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544) provides for the FWS and other Federal agencies to conserve 
species determined to be endangered or threatened. 
Regionally, Presidential involvement in darn management has occurred over 
the years. President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Tennessee Valley Authority 
in 1933. The TV A is charged with the regional development of the Tennessee River 
based on an integrated system of multi-purpose darns, 30 in all. They are managed 
for navigation, flood control, hydroelectric power, soil conservation, fishing, and 
public health (Smith 1972, 228). Three other regional systems are in place at this 
time, the Columbia River Basin Commission, the Susquehanna River Basin 
Commission, and the Delaware River Basin Commission. 
Closer to horne, the Arkansas River Basin Compact of 1970 (P.L. 93-152), 
between Oklahoma and Arkansas, apportions the waters of the Arkansas River 
basin, creates the Arkansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River Basin Compact Commission 
to administer apportionment, encourage pollution abatement programs, and 
facilitate cooperation for total management of water resources in the river basin. 
Many states now participate in interstate compact commissions. 
At the state level, each state has some kind of water management agency. 
In Oklahoma, the agency is called the Oklahoma Water Resources Board. The 
Board's duties are described in Chapter III. State agendes are usually responsible 
for working with local and private entities concerning water resource issues. 
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Because of the complexity, the U.S. water management institutions can be 
difficult to work within. Bromley, Butcher and Smith (1974) looked at the overall 
implications of the National Water Commission's report from June 1973. The report 
contained 290 separate recommendations and, not surprisingly, the Commission 
decided that the answer to the nation's water "problem" is said to lie primarily in 
institutional reform, broadly defined (1974, 15). 
CHAPTER II 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY 
Description of the Framework for Analysis 
To analyze the Lake Frances Dam case study, Craine's 1969 framework for 
analysis and criteria will be used, although slightly modified to reflect some of the 
ideas set forth in his 1971 paper. 
In the introduction of Craine's book, he recognizes the fact that the United 
States was at that time, and still is, in need of an effective water management 
system. He believed that by presenting the British developments, it would prove to 
be useful for the large urbanizing regions of the United States, and for individual 
states seeking a more effective role in water resources affairs (1969, 3). A state must 
be proficient at conducting its own affairs within its boundaries at the same time 
that it attempts to develop and participate in national strategies. 
This case study analyzes one small part of that idea. There are 75 dams in 
Oklahoma impounding reservoirs of 1,000 to 4,999 acre feet, one of which is Lake 
Frances, and there are 2,833 dams impounding 999 acre feet or less (OWRB 1984, 
183). Obviously, the nature of the institutional arrangement responsible for 
managing these small dams can greatly affect the water management of the whole 
state. In turn, it is the objective of this study to discover what arrangement is in 
place now, and make suggestions for future institutional management of these 
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small darns. 
Craine identifies five governmental techniques for affecting water 
management, which will be adapted to small dam management as described in 
Chapter III. Since this case involves private and governmental entities, the adjective 
"governmental" will be eliminated. These techniques have a general progressional 
relationship in extent of responsibility and degree of intervention, with all five 
techniques being employed in only the most advanced forms of institutional 
arrangements, (i.e. TV A). (see Figure 3). 
The early stages of intelligence, as well as identification and planning can 
serve as a basis for regulation of water use, development of water resources, and 
regional distribution and disposal. The extent and kind of involvement are 
dependent upon specific circumstances of time and place. Craine notes that the 
government may choose to be involved only to provide a policy environment 
(which would include the first three stages), influencing private entrepreneurs, local 
governments, and other agencies to operate independently within this policy 
framework. Such is the case in this study. 
The first technique is water resource intelligence. This encompasses many 
activities, such as collection and dissemination of hydrologic data or provision of 
social and economic data. 
Second comes identification of resource potentials and planning. This 
technique can be as simple as inventorying resources, projecting growth demands, 
suggesting ways of responding to demands or preparing reconnaissance "planning" 
studies. Presumably, these reports would result in a general consensus of desired 
actions. The reports would also provide a framework within which independent 
water use and development agents can proceed towards water management goals 
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without serious conflict or losses in efficiency. As a part of this notion, great 
emphasis has been put on the planning product, often to the neglect of the planning 
process as an instrument of communication and education among the interests 
involved. At the other extreme, the government should provide specifications and 
schedules of actions to be taken, and who should take them. 
The third technique is regulation of water use. There are three principal 
public ways of regulating the use of water resources: 
(1) Promulgation and enforcement of standards prescribing conditions under 
which uses are permitted or constrained. (This protects water quality). 
(2) Administrative, judicial, or legislative allocations of water for specific 
uses and/ or users. (This controls water quantity). 
(3) Pricing of water uses in such a way as to influence the kind, amount, and 
timing of use. (This encourages efficiency). 
These three ways are not mutually exclusive but can be most effective when they 
supplement one another. 
The fourth technique is to develop water resources. This can be 
characterized as the capacity to apply engineering and construction skills to an 
entire hydrologic system with the objective of maximizing the capacity of that 
specific resource to serve society. To what extent can the institutional arrangements 
provide development facilities that are designed and operated to avoid spillover 
costs and take advantage of spillover benefits associated with the interdependencies 
of the hydrologic system? 
Three methods of providing coordinated development fadlities are generally 
available: 
(1) direct public planning, design, construction, and operation of 
development facilities; 
(2) public regulation of design, construction, and operation of new projects 
by independent development agents; and 
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(3) contractual agreement between public agency and independent operator 
of existing facilities regarding operation of projects. 
All three of these methods are presumed to be most effective if they are used to 
supplement one another and if they are performed by a regional water management 
agency that comprehends and controls the entire hydrologic system. The primary 
test of effectiveness is the extent to which significant externalities stemming from 
hydrologic interdependencies are considered and adjusted in planning, design, and 
operating decisions. 
The fifth technique is the organization of regional water distribution and 
disposal systems. Achieving coordinated distribution and disposal systems 
depends upon three kinds of authorization: 
(1) authority to design, construct, and operate a regional system; 
(2) authority to acquire existing systems and to integrate their operations as 
indicated; and 
(3) authority to direct operations and to require interconnections and sharing 
of common facilities among independent systems. 
The above descriptive analysis of the nature of water management provides 
a basis for suggesting six essential characteristics of institutional arrangements. The 
criteria will be described here and used in Chapter IV as the basis for evaluating 
the institutions in Oklahoma as they apply to the management of the Lake Frances 
dam. 
(1) Application of the Range of Techniques 
(2) Consideration and Adjustment to Externalities 
(3) Flexibility of Water Management Actions 
(4) Consideration of a Range of Relevant Values 
(5) Efficient Water Management Financing 
(6) Government as a Continuing Function 
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The first criterion is asking to what extent is the institutional system 
equipped to operate at Stage 5, which is regional distribution and disposal. To 
analyze this, it is necessary first to determine the stage at which the current system 
is operating, then establish whether the required techniques are made available 
through authorizations to exercise legal powers and conduct specific activities. 
After this determination the question then becomes whether the authorizations are 
appropriate and adequate to implement the technique or not, and whether the 
administrative responsibility for the authorized activities is under unified command 
or fragmented. Realizing that Oklahoma is not operating at Stage 5, the goal then 
becomes establishing how effectively we are operating at our present stage. 
The second criterion relates to the concept of river basin management. This 
would mean realizing that, whether it is politically recognized or not, the Lake 
Frances Dam is part of the illinois River Basin, and decisions affecting the dam 
affect the whole system. So in this case, how was the externality (Lake Frances 
Dam) handled? Who is responsible for the effects of management decisions 
applying to the dam? Are the affected parties considered in these decisions? Are 
there legal and administrative requirements for doing so? 
The third criterion seeks to answer the question of flexibility within the 
system. What degree of administrative discretion is provided in the law? To what 
extent are specific decisions constrained by administrative goals, policies, and 
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standards? To what extent can decisions be reassessed and adjusted over time? 
Craine notes that a satisfactory management system should provide adequate 
security to independent entrepreneurs and development agencies without creating 
an operational straightjacket that restricts any shift in the patterns of resource use. 
The fourth criterion explores the institution's ability to express and consider 
the range of values relevant to a water, or in this case dam, management decision. 
Due to the stage at which Oklahoma operates, two of Craine's original aspects of 
this criterion are not applicable here. They explore extension of the jurisdiction of a 
regional water management agency, and the role that pricing and inter-system 
transfer payments play. Those two questions will not be considered in this case 
study. However, four of the aspects are relevant. First of all, formal interagency 
review procedures may provide linkages through which non-monetary values find 
expression in the decision process. Secondly, the nature of representation provided 
on a governing board is a vital aspect in assuring that all relevant interests 
participate in decisions. Thirdly, the rules by which decisions are made within 
agencies are important in determining whether values are properly considered in 
decisions. Last of all, in many instances, requirements for consultations in 
formulating proposals and provisions for appeals and hearings may be the last 
resort for an individual or group seeking to be sure that its point of view and value 
are given consideration. 
The fifth criterion is whether the entities of the institution have the ability to 
finance water management consistent with its objective of efficiency. Are there any 
unusual obstacles to raising capital and operating funds? What is the extent to 
which disconformities in the incidence of costs and the incidence of benefits 
encourage inefficiencies? 
The last criterion is the extent to which water management is recognized 
and built into government as a continuing function. This means are there any ad 
hoc arrangements? Are there any procedures for relating water management 
decisions to other relevant governmental policies and operations? 
Methodology 
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The methodology component of this case study consists of three aspects, the 
selection of an appropriate model with which to analyze the institutional 
arrangements, the preparation of a chronology of events concerning Lake Frances, 
and analysis of the Lake Frances case study, using the selected model. 
The review of institutional arrangement studies literature was conducted at 
the Edmon Low Library at Oklahoma State University, with additional materials 
obtained through the Interlibrary Loan system. The intent of this search was to 
select the most appropriate model for analyzing this case study. 
In researching the water management institutions of Oklahoma and how it 
affected the Lake Frances Dam, it was necessary to inspect historical literature and 
documents. The Oklahoma Scenic Rivers Commission provided records of their 
Commission meetings where decisions concerning the Lake Frances Dam were 
made. The Oklahoma Water Resources Board had inspection records and copies of 
correspondence with Siloam Springs city officials. These records provided 
information on the historic management of the dam. 
Regional newspapers such as the Tahlequah Daily Pictorial Press, the 
Muskogee Phoenix, and the Siloam Springs Herald-Democrat, all carried additional 
information on the Lake Frances Dam throughout its colorful past. 
Together these sources provided the necessary information to evaluate this 
case study, based on Craine's criteria. Due to the nature of the problem and 
Craine's model, the analysis was completed with qualitative methods, rather than 
quantitative ones. 
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CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDY OF LAKE FRANCES 
Description of Relevant Entities 
Water management can be viewed as a system to which the resource itself is 
the input to be managed for a variety of outputs (see Figure 4). Although this 
figure notes water management outputs, they are similar to what will be noted 
here. The desired output of any given entity will naturally affect its management 
decisions. As each of the relevant entities are reviewed, the desired output of each, 
concerning this case, will be revealed and considered as the case study develops. 
Figure 5 is provided as a quick reference to the key participants and their outputs 
for this case study. 
Four federal agencies have potential involvement in the Lake Frances Darn 
history, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency. 
Until 1981, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) was in charge of 
routine darn inspections, with authority to repair or replace unsafe structures. The 
primary desired outputs would be water quality and darn safety. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over 
non-federal darns providing hydroelectric power. FERC cannot allow hydroelectric 
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developments that would impair the values for which the river was listed (16 
U.S.C. § 1278(a) 1982). The FERC must produce an environmental assessment 
pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. § 4332, 18 
C.F.R. § 380.6) The outputs it would be most interested in would be hydroelectric 
power feasibility and environmental amenities. 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is involved in any inspection in the 
state that might contain a wetland or endangered species. Its primary desired 
output would be environmental amenities. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted $100,000 to the OWRB 
for the purpose of a Clean Lake Study of Lake Frances. Its primary desired output 
would be water quality. 
There are two primary, and four secondary state-level agencies involved in 
this case study. The Oklahoma Water Resources Board and the Oklahoma Scenic 
Rivers Commission are the primary agencies. The Arkansas Department of Health, 
the State District Court of Adair County, Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Department of 
Wildlife Conservation, and the Oklahoma Department of Tourism and Recreation 
all played small parts in the history of the Lake Frances Dam controversy. 
The Eighth Legislative Assembly of Oklahoma Territory enacted the first 
water law in 1905, outlining the procedure for acquiring water rights, regulating the 
use of water, and creating the post of territorial engineer (OWRB 1984, 7). The 
Oklahoma Legislature created the State Planning and Resources Board in 1935 and 
included in its jurisdiction parks, forestry, and water resources (OWRB 1984, 8). 
In 1957 the 26th Oklahoma Legislature authorized the creation of the 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board, a panel of seven which held its first meeting on 
June 14, 1957 (OWRB). In 1972, two at-large seats were added to the Board. In 
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1974, the Oklahoma Legislature charged the OWRB to develop a long-range plan 
for the orderly control, protection, conservation, development, and utilization of the 
water resources of the state. As a result, the Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan 
was adopted by the First Session of the 38th Legislature in 1980 (OWRB 1984, 10). 
For planning purposes, the state is divided into eight regions according to 
the characteristics they shared. A plan of development and the costs for 
implementation of the plan were prepared for each region. The refinement of these 
plans and updating supply I demand estimates remains one of the principal 
concerns of the Board's Planning and Development Division (OWRB 1984, 10). The 
OWRB is responsible for inspections of all dams in Oklahoma, no matter what the 
size or who owns it. Being a state organization, the OWRB is interested in all of 
the outputs of the state's water resource management system. 
In 1977, Title 82 O.S. §§ 1451 - 1471 gave the Oklahoma Scenic Rivers 
Commission (OSRC) authority for the illinois River, Flint Creek, and a portion of 
Barren Fork Creek. On the Illinois River, the OSRC's authority extends from the 
state line to the confluence with the Barren Fork Creek. The Commission consists 
of twelve members. They are officially charged with the protection and 
development of the state's Scenic River Areas and contiguous lands. One of the 
most pertinent standards the Commission subscribes to is that, "should pollution or 
the possibility of pollution be a threat. .. , regardless of the distance or by whom, it 
will be the responsibility of the OSRC to report the problem to the State Health 
Department, the OWRB, the EPA, law enforcement agencies, or any other 
appropriate agencies for proper management (OSRC 1989, 37)." The statutory 
provisions give the Commission the right to request the Attorney General to bring 
an action for an injunction against violators of the provisions, orders, or 
determinations of the Commission. Violators would be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Each day upon which such violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation 
(OSRC 1989). Its primary desired outputs would be environmental amenities 
(including scenic values), flood damage reduction, and recreation. 
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The Arkansas Department of Health is charged with enforcement of federal 
regulations concerning clean water standards. The primary desired output would 
be water quality. 
The Oklahoma Department of Wildlife Conservation (ODWC hereafter) is 
responsible for managing the resident fish and wildlife resources of the State of 
Oklahoma. They provided expert witness on inspections of Lake Frances, advising 
of any potential dangers to the fish of the Illinois River. The primary desired 
output would be environmental amenities. 
The Oklahoma Department of Tourism and Recreation oversees the budget 
of the Oklahoma Scenic Rivers Commission. All legislative appropriations for the 
Cominission go through the Tourism Department first. The primary desired output 
would be recreation. 
Two local entities were involved in the case study, the City of Siloam 
Springs, Arkansas (City hereafter), and the District Court of Adair County. The 
City was, during the time of this case study, dependent upon Lake Frances for its 
water supply. The City also provided water for the nearby community of Watts, 
Oklahoma, and West Siloam Springs, Oklahoma. The three primary outputs they 
desired were water quality, water quantity, and recreation. 
The District Court of Adair County, Oklahoma was responsible for the 
OWRB vs Illinois River Development Company case (No. C-89-196), which was 
filed with the Court. Usually, cases involved with state dams are tried in the 
county in which they are located. 
Some private parties were involved in this case study. The IDinois River 
Development Corporation, JDJ Energy Company, and local canoe operators. 
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The Illinois River Development Corporation (IRDC hereafter) was formed by 
the city officials of Siloam Springs for the purpose of operating a private dam 
within Oklahoma. Primary outputs desired would be municipal water supply and 
recreation. 
JDJ Energy Company (JDJ) is a private business which, at one time, 
contemplated the feasibility of locating a hydroelectric power generator at the Lake 
Frances Dam. Its primary desired output was hydroelectric power. 
The canoe operators located on the Illinois River in Oklahoma have an 
economic interest in the management of the Lake Frances Dam. Withholding 
instream flow or releasing polluted waters could substantially reduce their profits 
during prime floating months. Recreation was their primary desired output. 
Chronology of the Lake Frances Dam Management 
In the early 1920s, James W. Sloan bought 800 acres of land, then known as 
Forest Park, along the Dlinois River. A 70-acre lake existed on the property. Sloan 
decided to enlarge the lake for recreational purposes in 1931. The original planning 
and design of the Lake Frances Dam, which included a small hydroelectric plant, 
was by Victor H. Cochrane, a consulting engineer from Tulsa, Oklahoma. The 
newly created lake was christened on Memorial Day, May 30, 1931, and the lake 
was named after Sloan's daughter Frances. 
In developing Lake Frances as a recreational center, a grand resort was built 
with swank cabins and cottages nearby. Thus began the lake's true peak years of 
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popularity between 1931 and 1941, when motor boat races, canoeing, fishing, and 
parties at the resort were commonplace. Lake Frances drew vacationers from Tulsa, 
Dallas, Kansas City, and New Orleans, since the lake was developed before Lakes 
Tenkiller, Grand, or Texoma were built. 
The first failure of the Lake Frances Dam happened in 1943. Although the 
actual cause is not known, speculation was that the failure in the earth embankment 
adjacent to the concrete arch could have been caused by high flow. Because of 
economic consequences of WWII, the levee was restored, but the dam was left in 
disrepair. 
The neglected Lake Frances was given hope of new use in 1954 by the City. 
They purchased the project, through the IRDC. The lake was to be used as a water 
supply for Siloam Springs. The corporation was established because the city was 
advised that an out-of-state municipality could not own property in Oklahoma 
(Couch 1990, 1). Plans for reconstruction were prepared by Fell and Wheeler, 
consulting engineers, from Tulsa, Oklahoma. The reconstruction was completed 
shortly thereafter. In 1955 a water treatment plant was constructed. 
The Arkansas River Basin Compact of 1970 was negotiated between 
Oklahoma and Arkansas, giving Arkansas 60% of the annual flow of the Illinois 
River Subbasin. The OWRB issued a stream water appropriation permit to Siloam 
Springs for 9,000 acre-feet annually. According to Dean Couch, the permit did 
contain a condition that the authorized water come from Arkansas' share (1990, 1). 
The water quality of the Lake began to deteriorate due to eutrophication, 
and in October of 1971, a meeting was held to discuss the issue. The EPA; SCS; 
Arkansas Planning Commission; Watts, OK; Oklahoma State Department of Health; 
Siloam Springs, AR; and OWRB were represented. No decisions were made at this 
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meeting. 
To increase the available water supply, the City decided to raise the spillway 
elevation. On June 5, 1975, plans were submitted to the OWRB to raise the 
spillway elevation 1.5' with a concrete wall. McGoodwin, Williams, and Yates 
(MWY hereafter) were consulting engineers for the City. These plans were 
approved by the OWRB on July 8, 1975. 
In December of the same year it was necessary for the OWRB to remind 
MWY that a notice of completion was required for their June 5, 1975 proposal. 
MWY responded to the OWRB in January, 1976, advising that the city had not been 
able to begin construction. The new spillway was later completed. 
The next recorded event did not occur until February of 1978, when a Phase 
I Safety of Dams Inspection was performed on Lake Frances Dam by Col. A. Smith 
of the Corps, an OWRB representative, and Dennis Daniels, Water Plant 
Superintendent for the City. The Corps stated that the dam and spillway were 
inadequate, and classified the dam as high hazard potential (see Appendix A). A 
report to that effect was sent to Mayor Knight, of Siloam Springs, Oklahoma State 
Senator Herbert Rozell, and Oklahoma State Representative Wiley Sparkman. 
In response to that report, the OWRB received a request in May from Carl 
Yates, consulting engineer for Siloam Springs, asking how to obtain a Phase I 
report. In June, 1978, the OWRB sent a letter to Mayor Knight containing the plans 
and specifications. Yates sent the OWRB a letter in December, 1978, stating that the 
electric power generation feature of Lake Frances was to be abandoned. The 
response from the OWRB included a letter to Mayor Knight asking what the City 
planned to do and when. This same letter was sent again in January, 1979. It took 
two months for Yates to send a letter to the OWRB stating that the City would give 
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the Board a report on the proposed plans. The next correspondence did not occur 
until July 1979, when the OWRB sent a letter to the new Mayor Gosney again 
asking what the City planned to do and when. Gosney responded with a letter 
detailing the maintenance work to be completed. No official plans were submitted. 
It had then been two and a half years since the original safety inspection 
was completed. Siloam Springs hired a new City Administrator, Sid Moore, who 
quickly sent a letter to the OWRB asking for 90- 120 days to review the situation 
and ·submit a report. Finally on Dec. 23, 1980, the OWRB received a report from 
Moore detailing maintenance measures that would be taken, although Moore 
questioned the magnitude of possible flooding and extent of hazard projected by 
the safety inspection. 
In February of 1981, the OWRB received a $100,000 grant from the 
Environmental Protection Agency for a scientific study of the problems of Lake 
Frances, and the state matched the grant with $42,000. It took two years to 
complete the study. The EPA has a program, called a Clean Lakes Program, which 
gives states the opportunity to identify lakes in need of help for restoration. There 
are several phases in the process. The study completed on Lake Frances was a 
Phase I study (Threlkeld). After the EPA reviews the Phase I reports, it chooses the 
projects to invest in. Unfortunately, Lake Frances was not chosen, so the Phase I 
report was the end of this option for help. 
The Phase I study was useful in identifying many aspects of the whole 
management problem of Lake Frances, and was excellent in including the local 
residents in the process. One method the OWRB used to include public 
participation, was to set up a public meetings in surrounding communities, such as 
Watts, OK The purpose of the public meeting was to get citizens' ideas on how to 
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solve sedimentation and nutrient pollution of the lake. The OWRB also set up a 
citizens' advisory committee to work with the state on evaluating alternatives for 
solving the problems, and restoring the water quality of the lake. Some of the 
proposed options on improving the lake included dredging, draining, bulldozing, or 
lakeshore stabilization. 
From April to October of 1981, several letters passed among the OWRB, the 
OSRC, the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control, the Corps, and Senator 
Rozell. Most of the inquiries were either concerning the specifics of repairing the 
dam, such as breach analysis results, or the legal issues related to the background 
of the lake, such as requests for a copy of the Warranty Deed. 
In October of 1981, the National Dam Safety Act (33 U.S.C. § 467 et seq.) 
transferred jurisdiction over all water, which included authorization to repair or 
replace all water storage facilities, from the Corps to the OWRB. From this point 
on, the safety inspections and enforcement of the recommendations would be the 
responsibility of the OWRB. 
The first formal action by the Oklahoma Scenic Rivers Commission was 
taken in May of 1982. The OSRC enacted a resolution asking Siloam Springs to 
postpone draining the Lake. This was to have been done in order to make repairs 
at a water intake valve. The valve had been inoperative for a number of years due 
to a submerged log jam (Bone 1982a). 
The Commission cited four reasons for the resolution. First of all, the 
flushing would destroy spawning fish populations in the lake and river. Jim Smith 
of the Oklahoma Department of Wildlife Conservation agreed with this point. 
Second, it would ruin the integrity of a Clean Lake Study being done on Lake 
Frances. Third, it would violate Oklahoma water quality standards, and last, it 
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would cause a hardship on the float trip business. The City had been trying to do 
the repairs since the preceding fall, but construction equipment was not available. 
According to City administrators, the City would save several thousands of dollars 
by hiring equipment that was already in the area. To bring the contractor back 
would cost $5,000 to $6,000. 
Rep. Bill Willis, D-Tahlequah, and Senator Herb Rozell, D-Tahlequah, 
promised to seek a $3,000 to $4,000 state appropriation if Siloam Springs officials 
agreed to wait. The appropriation would be included in the OSRC budget to help 
offset the increased costs Siloam Springs would incur by a delay. 
Canoe operators feared that the river would be too low to float while the 
lake was being refilled after repairs. Julian Fite, a Muskogee attorney, represented 
the operators, and promised to take legal action if the draining was not postponed 
(Pruitt 1982). At the following Siloam Springs Board of Directors meeting, they 
voted to postpone the scheduled drainage of Lake Frances (Bone 1982b). 
On September 27, 1982, Jack Hoyt, a Siloam Springs official, furnished 
emergency contact information to the OWRB, and advised of a lake drawdown. 
In January of 1983 repairs on the Lake Frances Dam were almost complete, 
but the money Oklahoma legislators say was appropriated to pay the extra cost of 
delaying the project was actually to be spent on a base station radio for illinois 
River rangers. The OSRC voted to endorse a budget committee recommendation to 
that effect. This was contrary to the informal agreement reached at the May 1982 
meeting. At the previous meeting, OSRC members present had stressed the 
importance of a friendly solution to the problem. The Oklahoma Department of 
Tourism and Recreation prepared a contract in November, agreeing to pay the city 
$3,500 for the additional expenses. The money was included in the OSRC budget, 
46 
but was not earmarked specifically for the dam repair. The OSRC was funded at 
$138,000 for the year, and had an additional carryover cash balance of $20,000. The 
$3,500 was included in the budget recommendations to the Commission by OSRC 
administrator John Shannon. The recommendation was then deleted by the 
Commission, who voted instead to use the money for the base station radio. 
Commission spokesmen claimed that the legislators (not the OSRC) had promised 
the extra money. Tourism Director Abe Hesser had understood that the OSRC had 
approached the legislators, found it disturbing that the Commission would ignore 
the intended purpose, and called the decision an "unwise one". Jack Hoyt laughed 
and said the repair work could be finished in two weeks once the weather cleared 
up (Bone 1983). 
On February 1, 1983, the OWRB requested a progress report on the darn 
repairs. Jack Hoyt advised that the service gates had been repaired, and tree and 
brush cutting was being accomplished. 
It was not until after the next routine inspection that the OWRB reported 
that the repairs made were not sufficient. So, in October of 1984, the City of Siloam 
Springs passed a resolution to repair the Lake Frances Darn and Spillway, 
indicating that work to correct deficiencies would be initiated in April 1985, and 
would be completed in January 1986. 
Dean Couch, OWRB staff attorney, notified Jack Hoyt of the time frame for 
completion of remedial measures, requiring the application for modification to be 
filed by Jan. 18, 1986. In February, 1985 Jack Hoyt wrote to Couch requesting an 
extension of time until Feb 19, 1987, to file the permit for modification. 
By this time the lake had been steadily filling up with sediment to the point 
that the City had been considering other sources for their municipal water supply. 
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One of their proposals was to elevate the dam and spillway level, by installing 
flashboards across the dam, to create a higher volume of available water. The 
OSRC requested the OWRB to deny the permit to obstruct the downstream flow of 
the Illinois River. In May, 1985, Couch denied the permit for installing flashboards. 
Harold Springer, OWRB engineer, noted to Hoyt that an OWRB staff 
member would be going to look at the lake on June 8th or 9th, 1985. The 
inspection was completed, and the repairs at the dam were found to be insufficient. 
In December of 1985 an application for hydroelectric power was submitted 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by JDJ Energy Company, to refurbish 
an abandoned powerhouse, and to locate a small power generator at the Lake 
Frances Dam. This was another option for use of the dam that the City of Siloam 
Springs was exploring. H they could get a company interested in locating a power 
generator at the dam, they would receive help with the cost of repairing the dam. 
The next routine inspection of the Lake Frances dam came on May 29, 1986. 
In attendance were Harold Springer, OWRB Chief Engineer; Art Cotton and Gavin 
Brady, from OWRB; Jack Hoyt, City of Siloam Springs; Alan Fortenberry, Engineer 
with MWY; and Ed Fite, Director of the OSRC. The necessary repairs and a 
schedule of time for compliance were discussed and agreed upon. This inspection 
was followed up by a letter from Springer to Hoyt, summarizing the inspection and 
requesting certain items. 
In August of 1986, the OWRB received the draft Phase II Report and original 
Phase I Report for repairs to Lake Frances from Fortenberry. In September of 1986, 
OWRB staff found discrepancies with USGS topographic maps that would change 
the size classification of the project, and thereby change the requirements for 
repairs. That information was requested by JDJ Energy Company since it would 
affect their plans for hydroelectric power development. The OWRB responded to 
JDJ in April of 1987, stating that Lake Frances was still classified as a high hazard 
dam. 
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On May 19, 1987, Ed Fite called Springer about Siloam Springs' opening of a 
sluice gate at Lake Frances, thereby releasing poor quality water downstream. They 
also discussed the status of the dam and repair schedule problems. Several calls to 
Alan Fortenberry resulted. 
On July 2, 1987, over four months past the due date, the OWRB received an 
application to repair and improve the Lake Frances Dam from the lllinois River 
Development Company. The application also requested that the dam be 
redesignated as a small structure, significant hazard, instead of the current listing of 
large structure, high hazard (see Appendix A), the main difference being in the 
final cost of repair. As of 1977, the OWRB had used the dam breech analysis test to 
model a dam failure to estimate the loss of property and life, thereby setting the 
hazard level (Application No. DS-87-09). 
A public hearing on application DS-87-09, set by the OWRB, commenced in 
Tulsa on August 26, 1987. The hearing reconvened on October 22, 1987. 
In September of 1987, the City installed a makeshift 18" high wooden wall 
across the dam, in an effort to raise the lake level to insure an ample drinking 
water supply. Since the sluice gates were inoperative, the lllinois River level was 
lowered, causing distress among the canoe operators. On September 9, 1987, the 
OWRB, OSRC, and six canoe operators inspected the dam. Art Cotton, OWRB 
representative, immediately initiated an attempt to file an injunction against the 
city, and sent a letter to Siloam Springs officials saying they could not impede the 
flow of water to downstream users. The letter was to have been mailed Friday, the 
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11th, but in the early hours of Thursday morning, a vigilante removed the boards. 
In an attempt to help the City, the OSRC voted on September 16, 1987, for 
Director Ed Fite to research the feasibility of Siloam Springs using Beaver Lake in 
Arkansas as a water supply. The OSRC has jurisdiction over Lake Frances, but did 
not want to declare it a public nuisance until the dty could find another water 
supply (Hales 1987). 
Also in September, 1987, the OWRB sent a letter to JDJ stating denial of 
Section 401 Certification. With this option exhausted, the OWRB inspected the dam 
again. Present at the inspection were Russell LaForce, and Gavin Brady, both of 
OWRB; Jim Corl and Stu Thomas, Siloam Springs; Ed Fite and Archie Payton, 
OSRC; and Alan Fortenberry, Project Engineer. 
The hearing from August was reopened on October 22, 1987, on application 
DS-87-{)9 with witnesses giving testimony and additional exhibits being presented. 
The final analysis from the OWRB was officially documented on January 12, 1988. 
These Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Board order were approved by the 
OWRB on application DS-87-{)9 (see Appendix B). Among the numerous unsafe 
features of the dam was a horizontal crack in the main spillway, approximately 4" 
wide on the upstream side, and approximately 75' long. The Board found that the 
crack in the dam did not have a significant probability of slipping or being lost, and 
therefore anchors did not need to be inserted. This crack caused the inevitable 
failure in May 1990. The Board also ordered the City to install a siren, and file an 
emergency action plan that was to have been reviewed, and approved by, the 
OWRB, the Adair County Civil Defense and the OSRC by April11, before the 1988 
recreation season began on the illinois River (Frank 1988a). The OWRB followed 
this up with a letter requesting an update from the City. 
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A newspaper article dated May 6, 1988, states that Jim Corl, Siloam Springs 
City administrator, reportedly told the OWRB that the City did not need to comply 
with the order (Frank 1988a). 
On June 22, 1988, the OSRC voted to ask the State Attorney General's office 
to file a class action suit against the city of Siloam Springs, citing Lake Frances Darn 
and Reservoir as public nuisances. The Commission specified water quality and 
darn safety as primary concerns to be addressed in the suit. This carne on the heels 
of a suit filed by the OWRB against the Illinois River Development Co., Siloam 
Springs and James D. Corl III, Siloam Springs city administrator, for failure to 
comply with a board order to submit an emergency action plan, and install a siren 
for the area below the darn and spillway (Frank 1988b). 
In August of 1988, the OSRC directed Ed Fite to contact the State Attorney 
General's office to find out its decision as to whether or not to pursue the suit 
against Siloam Springs. Fite had notified the Attorney General after the June 
meeting, but had not received a reply as to its position. The OSRC stated it would 
probably hire legal counsel of its own if the Attorney General's office did not 
pursue the suit. The OSRC was prompted to take action after what they felt was a 
lack of cooperation and good faith on the part of Siloam Springs city officials (no 
action was ever taken). A teleVision reporter from Tulsa, who would testify, said 
Corl told him he was not concerned with the water quality of the Illinois River 
(Edelman 1988). 
Once again, in August of 1988 an on-site inspection was made by the 
OWRB, OSRC, Siloam Springs, and several engineers, to determine whether the 
cracks and the uncertain condition of a 7,000' earthen section of the darn were 
unsafe. The lake level had fallen to 18". The OWRB Hearing Examiner gave Siloam 
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Springs 31 days, (Sept. 26), to come up with a time frame for making repairs. The 
inspection report said they were waiting for the FERC's report as to the suitability 
of the site for a hydroelectric power generator. Rex Earl Starr, attorney for the city 
of Siloam Springs, interrogated the OWRB engineer regarding inspections he made 
in 1985 and 1986. Starr said the engineer failed to make any notations in 
subsequent memos and reports, indicating that the dam was unsafe. LaForge, of 
the OWRB, did say he observed some seepage through cracks in the spillway as 
early as 1985. He saw no immediate problem, but said that didn't mean there 
weren't any. Earlier, an engineer with a Fayetteville consulting firm said that a 
stability analysis indicated that the materials used to build the dam and its 
foundation were strong. Jim Corl said the city was seeking a municipal bond to 
help pay for any improvements ordered (Frank 1988b). 
The first action taken by the Arkansas Dept. of Health was to give the City 
55 months (4 years and 7 months, April 1993) to abandon the lake as a water 
source. The Department informed the City that failure to meet time frame 
deadlines would make such measures as mandatory conservation and connection 
bans necessary. 
In December, 1988, the OWRB ordered the City and the IRDC to complete 
necessary repairs by Oct. 1, 1989, with repairs to be initiated by May 1989. The 
report does not state what the penalty for not complying would be. 
On April4, 1989, the Siloam Springs Board of Directors voted for Joe Tarvin, 
of MWY, to study the possibility of drawing water from the lake and constructing a 
supplemental water supply, with the cost of the continued study not to exceed 
$35,000. The Board reportedly was concerned over using the river due to 
uncertainty about the long-range water quality, and whether it had adequate flow 
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to meet the needs of the city's growing population. Another option was to 
continue to use the city-owned Lake Frances, and build a new impoundment, or 
use the Illinois River supplemented by wells or the nearby Beaver Lake. The river 
proposal would also include a new water treatment plant. At the time Siloam 
Springs also provided water for West Siloam Springs, OK, and Watts, OK. If they 
decided not to use Lake Frances, Tarvin said he would suggest the city do nothing 
with it and see what the state of OK would do with the structure (Bielser 1989a). 
A June, 1989, article reported that the City of Siloam Springs had recently 
offered to sell the Lake Frances Darn to the State of Oklahoma for $1. The OSRC 
considered the offer with five alternatives upon acceptance: 
(1) leave the darn in its present condition with the exception of removing the 
gates, 
(2) repair the darn and dredge the lake, 
(3) build a larger darn and raise the lake level, 
(4) remove the darn and stabilize the bottom of the stream by planting grass, 
(5) or build a new channel around the lake (Edelman 1989a). 
The Attorney General's office said that the OSRC would need to confer with other 
state agencies before purchasing the lake. Ed Fite cited an OK law empowering the 
commission to accept real and personal property to implement the OK Scenic Rivers 
Act. Such action was never taken. 
Bob Henry, chairman of IRDC, said the city borrowed the money to fix the 
dam, then decided against the repairs. They didn't have enough to dredge the lake, 
but they did have enough to have made the necessary repairs at one time. He 
contends it would be to Oklahoma's advantage to dredge the lake since they are 
downstream (Hales 1989a). 
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Siloam Springs appealed the December, 1988, OWRB order in Adair District 
Court, in Stilwell. In July, 1989, the appeal was rejected. The City's options were 
then to appeal to the State Supreme Court, or to ignore the OWRB order. U they 
ignored it, the dty would be guilty of a misdemeanor for each day of 
noncompliance. The OWRB could file a criminal complaint, based on the potential 
damage. 
Ignoring the compliance, the Siloam Springs officials contacted the Arkansas 
Department of Health in July of 1989 for permission to move their water intake 
upstream from Lake Frances. The new Mayor M.L. "Moose" Van Pouche said, 
"We're going to try to do everything we can to assist Oklahoma in working this 
thing out and make sure we're all shooting for the same thing." The OSRC dectded 
they did not have the money to face the problems with taking the Lake over. Ed 
Fite said City offictals had promised to mail a letter in August outlining their 
proposal about Lake Frances. Van Pouche said the letter might not be written until 
September, depending on when the Department of Health submitted their report 
(Hales 1989b). 
In the meantime, the OSRC asked the Attorney General's office to pursue 
avenues to remove the dam and have the lake drained. Ed Fite and commissioners 
attended a meeting Friday, July 7, 1989, where the dty said it never offered to sell 
the lake. Officials said they would send a letter to the OSRC detailing what they 
intend to do about the dam, but the letter had not arrived by Tuesday (Edelman 
1989b). At this point a reporter writes that there seemed to be a recurrence of bad 
communications between File and Corl, something that had plagued discussions 
about Lake Frances for years. The promised letter had been mailed Monday 
evening, July 12th. By way of explanation, the OSRC meeting that evening was a 
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special business meeting that was held a week earlier than their bi-monthly general 
meeting, causing a misunderstanding about the deadline (Bielser 1989b). 
As prompted by the OSRC on July 11th, Attorney General Robert Henry 
asked three state agencies for ammunition to assist his office in the effort to force 
Siloam Springs to repair the dam. The OSRC, OWRB, and ODWC were to submit a 
memorandum to the Attorney General's office, which would include what the 
agencies felt was the problem with the dam and lake. At the July 11th meeting, the 
OSRC declared the dam, spillway, and lake a nuisance, a necessary step before the 
commission could involve itself in any legal action. 
Predictably, an October 2, 1989, inspection by the OWRB found the dam and 
spillway to be in a substantially unsafe condition. On October 22, 1989, the OWRB 
filed a contempt of court motion against the IRDC when they failed to act on the 
court order requiring repairs. The order, filed in Adair County Court, Oklahoma, 
had given them until October 1, 1989 to complete repairs {Edelman 1989c). 
On November 2, 1989, the Adair County Court ordered {No. C-89-196) that a 
temporary injunction be issued prohibiting Siloam Springs from continuing in 
violation of the administrative order issued by the OWRB on Dec. 13, 1988. The 
Court ordered that the defendants proceed immediately to initiate the remedial 
measures of the order, as expeditiously as possible, weather permitting. Repairs 
should be completed by July 1, 1990. Furthermore, the defendants should file a 
written status report at the end of each month, setting forth in detail all actions 
taken with regard to bringing Lake Frances Dam and Spillway into safe condition 
and in compliance with this Order. A copy should also be provided by the 
defendants to the OWRB. 
At a January 16, 1990 meeting in Siloam Springs between the OSRC and the 
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Siloam Springs Board of Directors it was reported that the lake was now believed to 
have an average depth of 3 feet, making the cost of dredging infeasible. Therefore, 
the dty was in the midst of building a 1.5 million gallon storage tank. Siloam 
Springs said it had complied with three of the nine measures necessary in the 
OWRB order. Ed Fite disagreed that the measures had been complied with fully. 
Previously the Siloam Springs voters had approved a $400,000 bond issue, with a 
portion of that having been spent on the three measures. The City also reported 
that it had received quotes ranging from $20,000 to $25,000 on patching the "leak" 
(Edelman 1990a). 
At a February, 1990, meeting the OSRC voted to reinitiate the intent of the 
motion, made in July, calling for the Attorney General's office to pursue all legal 
avenues to have Lake Frances declared a public nuisance, and seek a court order to 
have the dam removed and the lake drained. The intent of the commission was to 
have the two gates of the dam opened in an attempt to improve the water quality 
of the illinois River. Ed Fite said the top gate was completely closed, while the 
bottom gate was opened slightly. The City reportedly accepted a bid from the 
Haliburton Co. to fill the crack with grout at an estimate of $11,000 to $25~. Fite 
noted that the estimate was a far cry from the figures that had projected in past 
years, which ranged anywhere from a quarter million to a half million dollars. The 
work was to begin that week, Fite said. 
IRDC officials adopted a resolution on April 17 to have City administrator 
Jim Corl negotiate with "any and all OK authorities for the transfer of title to Lake 
Frances." The resolution stipulated that the City would retain ownership and 
control of necessary backup pumping facilities that could provide an alternate form 
of water withdrawal. The offer would be open until Sept. 1, 1990, when, if no one 
-, 
56 
accepted the offer, the city administrator was instructed to file the necessary papers 
that would have the ultimate effect of removing Lake Frances as a water 
impoundment (Bielser 1990). 
On May 3, 1990, a 75' portion of the dam above the crack was swept away 
by floodwaters. The main cap on the spillway shifted from six to eight feet, 
damaging the control mechanism and preventing officials from making adjustments 
to lower the level of the lake. Under ordinary circumstances, officials said, the 
spillway gate was raised and lowered by attaching a cable and pulling it with a 
tractor (Poindexter 1990). 
In July of 1990 the FERC issued its hydropower license to JDJ, although it 
cited nine major environmental issues related to construction of a hydroelectric 
facility on Lake Frances. Before the final FERC report was made, it received official 
requests to deny the permit from the OSRC and the OWRB, and the OWRB filed a 
motion for rehearing with the FERC, due to the failure of the dam (Couch 1990, 3). 
This concludes the approximately 70-year chronology of the management of 
the Lake Frances Dam that this case study covers. It is by no means an exhaustive 
report of the correspondence and happenings, it is only the highlights of the dam 
safety issue. Notes, not documented newspaper articles, were obtained through the 
records of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board file on Lake Frances, or the 
Oklahoma Scenic Rivers Commission file on Lake Frances. The records are public 
and can be accessed during normal business hours. 
Appendix B contains a complete copy of the original Adair County Court 
Order, and the OWRB Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Board Order. 
These give a complete technical description of the case, including the law behind 
the OWRB actions. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In Chapter ll, Craine's Framework for analysis was outlined. He identified 
five techniques for affecting water management, with all five techniques being 
employed in only the most advanced forms of institutional arrangements (see 
Figure 3, page 27). These techniques illustrate the general nature of water 
management. To determine the extent and degree of efficiency to which they are 
being applied, Craine suggests six criteria. Some minor changes to the criteria will 
be necessary in this case study since the management of the Lake Frances Dam is 
the focus, not the water resource itself. All five techniques will be discussed, 
followed by an analysis using the six criteria. 
Most of the information used for the analysis is assembled, and fully 
documented, in Chapter Ill, in the form of a chronology of the Lake Frances Dam 
management. Also provided in Chapter lli is a quick reference to the entities 
involved in this case, and the abbreviation used for each. For technical reference, 
Appendix B contains the Adair County Court Order from the OWRB for the repairs 
of the Dam, and the OWRB Findings of Fact in the case. 
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Technique Analysis 
Water Resource Intelligence 
The first and most basic technique of water resource intelligence 
encompasses many activities, such as collection and dissemination of hydrologic 
data or provision of social and economic data. During the years considered in this 
case study, three primary types of data have been collected; hydrologic, dam 
safety, and repair potential. 
When the lake and dam were first established in 1931, they were privately 
owned and developed by James W. Sloan. Since they were privately owned, the 
collection of hydrologic data was done by Victor Cochrane, the consulting engineer. 
The Corps conducted routine dam safety inspections until 1981, when the 
responsibility was given to the OWRB. Also in 1981, the OWRB received a $100,000 
grant from the EPA to conduct a scientific study of the problems and repair options 
of the Lake and Dam. The state also contributed $42,000 to the study. The study 
included every aspect of the Lake and surrounding area (Threlkeld 1983). The data 
collected by the Clean Lake Study was particularly helpful to the OWRB in bringing 
the problems of the Lake into sharper focus, and formulating solutions. 
As far as dissemination of the data collected goes, the reports made by the 
OWRB are open to the public, and have been shared with the City, the OSRC, or 
any other interested parties over the course of the years included in this study. 
The collection of any economic data, concerning the possibilities of repairing 
the dam, was strictly the City's responsibility, due to private ownership by the 
!ROC. 
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Identification of Resource Potentials and Planning 
The second technique affecting dam management is the identification of 
resource potentials and planning. This technique includes such projects as 
inventorying resources, projecting growth demands, suggesting ways to respond to 
those demands, and preparing reconnaissance planning studies. 
The first aspect of inventorying resources included monitoring dam safety 
and the effects of darn management on the water supply. In 1954, the IROC bought 
Lake Frances for a municipal water supply for the City of Siloam Springs, AR. The 
OWRB inventories and manages the waters of the state, so it granted water rights 
permits to the City. The City then sold water, by contract, to the nearby 
communities of Watts, OK, and West Siloam Springs, OK. It was the City's 
responsibility, as managers of the darn, to ensure an adequate supply of clean water 
in the reservoir. 
Since the Darn is located in Oklahoma, the OWRB had authority over it and 
monitored it for safety. As noted earlier, the Corps was responsible for routine 
safety inspections of the darn until 1981, when the OWRB took over the inspections. 
The OWRB conducts routine safety inspections, and files reports indicating the 
findings. Copies of the reports were sent to the City administrators with specific 
actions to be taken outlined to remedy the problems. The darn was found in 
disrepair several times over the years. 
The second and third aspects, projecting growth demands and suggesting 
ways of responding to them, are primarily the City's responsibility. The City 
managed the dam to provide rnunidpal water supply for itself, as well as for Watts, 
OK, and West Siloam Springs, OK. Part of this responsibility would include 
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projecting their own growth demands to determine whether their water supply was 
adequate for all parties. In response to increased demands or inadequate supply, 
the City could ask for suggestions from the OWRB, but they have generally not 
followed the OWRB suggestions when given. The OSRC voted, at one time, to help 
the City by researching the feasibility of the City using Beaver Lake in Arkansas as 
a water supply. 
The fourth aspect of this technique is preparing reconnaissance planning 
studies. The foremost concern of the OWRB has been dam safety. It filed reports 
each time an inspection was completed, and copies were sent to concerned parties. 
The reports always contained desired actions to be taken. Other than the routine 
safety inspections, the OWRB, by way of a grant by the EPA, conducted a Clean 
Lake Study as reviewed in Chapter III, although not required to by law. The 
private dam owners developed an Emergency Action Plan to minimize downstream 
damage in case of a darn breech. The Plan was required and approved by the 
OWRB. 
In theory, the combination of these various reports would result in a general 
consensus of desired actions. The reports would also provide a framework within 
which independent water use and development agents could proceed towards dam 
management goals without serious conflict or losses in efficiency. Craine notes that 
in the past, as a part of this notion, great emphasis has been put on the planning 
product, often to the neglect of the planning process as an instrument of 
communication and education among the interests involved. The other extreme 
would have more governmental involvement, with the government providing 
specifications and schedules of actions to be taken, and specifying by whom they 
should be taken. 
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In this case, the theory did not work smoothly. Although the OWRB 
provided many opportunities for resolving conflicts of its reported management 
goals, City officials and the OSRC had serious problems in reaching a consensus of 
desired actions. The planning process faltered, not only in the communication 
realm, but also in educating the City concerning the severity of the dam safety 
issue. City officials did not believe that a dam failure was imminent. 
Regulation of Water Use 
The third technique is regulation of water use. There are three principal 
ways of regulating the use of water resources. First of all is the promulgation and 
enforcement of standards prescribing conditions under which uses are permitted or 
constrained. The purpose of this would be to protect water quality. The OWRB 
controls the standards concerning dam safety and quality, thereby controlling the 
downstream water quality. The Lake Frances Dam is located on the Illinois River, a 
state-designated scenic river. Due to its location, the Dam directly affects the water 
quality and quantity of the lllinois, and so the OSRC has a vested interest in seeing 
that the standards set by the OWRB are carried out. The OSRC is often referred to 
as the "watchdog of the lllinois." If it suspects the OWRB standards are being 
violated, it can report directly to the OWRB. If corrective actions are not made, it 
can suggest that the Oklahoma Attorney General's Office look into filing a lawsuit 
against the City, citing the Lake Frances Dam and Reservoir as public nuisances. 
The Commissioners have requested that this action be taken a few times (see 
chronology). 
The second way to regulate water use is to contr~l allocations of water for 
specific uses and/or users by administrative, judicial, or legislative means. Again, 
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in Oklahoma the OWRB processes water rights applications. The primary use for 
the water is included and considered in the process. The OWRB has granted rights 
to the City, which did, in tum, contract for some of its apportionment to go to 
Watts, OK, and West Siloam Springs, OK. 
The third way to regulate water use is to price water uses in such a way as 
to influence the kind, amount, and timing of use. This would, hopefully, encourage 
efficiency. This particular aspect has been irrelevant in the management of the Lake 
Frances Dam. These three ways to regulate water use are not mutually exclusive 
but can be most effective when they supplement one another. 
Development of the Water Resource 
The fourth technique is to develop water resources. This can be 
characterized by the capacity to apply engineering and construction skills to an 
entire hydrologic system with the objective of maximizing the capacity of that 
specific resource to serve people. Also, to what extent can the institutional 
arrangements provide development facilities that are designed and operated to 
avoid spillover costs and take advantage of spillover benefits associated with the 
interdependencies of the hydrologic system? 
Three methods of providing coordinated development facilities are generally 
available: 
(1) direct public planning, design, construction and operation of 
development facilities. 
(2) public regulation of design, construction and operation of new projects 
by independent development agents. 
(3) contractual agreement between public agency and independent operator 
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of existing facilities regarding operation of projects. 
All three of these methods are presumed to be most effective if they are used to 
supplement one another and if they are performed by a regional water management 
agency that comprehends the entire hydrologic system. The primary test of 
effectiveness is the extent to which significant externalities stemming from 
hydrologic interdependencies are considered and adjusted in planning, design, and 
operating decisions. 
In seeking to find the depth to which this technique was employed in this 
case, it was revealed that, although Oklahoma and Arkansas are participants in the 
Arkansas River Basin Compact of 1970, the Compact does not provide for a 
separate supervising agency. It utilizes the water resource agencies and personnel 
within each state, and exists mainly to see that water rights and water quality 
standards are adhered to. At this point there does not seem to be any unified 
planning for the Arkansas River hydrologic system. The OWRB does use subbasin 
planning strategy, but its jurisdiction stops at the Oklahoma state line. 
Creation of a planning agency for the Arkansas River Basin can be achieved 
by an interstate water compact, which is ratified by all participating states, and the 
federal government. For the Arkansas River Basin, the states included in the 
compact would be Colorado, New Mexico, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, and 
Arkansas. 
Regional Water Distribution and Disposal Systems 
The fifth technique is the organization of regional water distribution and 
disposal systems. Achieving coordinated distribution and disposal systems 
depends upon three kinds of authorization: 
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(1) authority to design, construct, and operate a regional system. 
(2) authority to acquire existing systems and to integrate their operations as 
indicated. 
(3) authority to direct operations and to require interconnections and sharing 
of common facilities among independent systems. 
Again, the Lake Frances Dam is not a part of a regional hydrologic management 
plan. It is clear that, although efficient integrated water management would use all 
five techniques, Oklahoma's system has missing or weak elements. 
Criterion Analysis 
The above descriptive analysis of the nature of water management provides 
a basis for suggesting six essential characteristics of institutional arrangements. The 
criteria will be described here and used as the basis for evaluating the techniques 
that the water management institution in Oklahoma uses, as it applies to the 
management of the Lake Frances dam. 
Application of the Range of Techniques 
First, to what extent is the institutional system equipped to operate at Stage 
5, which is regional distribution and disposal. To analyze this, it is necessary first 
to determine at what stage the current system is operating, and then establish 
whether or not the required techniques are made available through authorizations 
to exercise legal powers and to conduct specific activities. 
As noted earlier, Oklahoma is a participant in an interstate water compact. 
However, the compact does not fully provide for regional hydrologic management. 
Only the first three techniques have been used in the history of the Lake Frances 
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Darn management, and will be considered here. 
Were the required techniques made available through authorizations to 
exercise legal powers and conduct specific activities? OWRB is legally authorized 
to make inspections of the Dam. Although they used grant money from the EPA to 
conduct the Clean Lake Study, they were not legally responsible for doing it. 
Because Lake Frances is privately owned by the IRDC, they were responsible for 
the collection of any hydrologic data needed to bring the dam up to OWRB 
standards, and the OWRB has cooperated in providing specifications as to what its 
standards are. The City was responsible for collecting the economic data needed to 
make the repairs. 
After this determination. the question then becomes whether or not the 
authorizations were appropriate and adequate to implement the technique, and was 
the administrative responsibility for the authorized activities under unified 
command or fragmented? 
The authorizations needed for executing technique one were sufficient, 
however, there were problems concerning technique two. There seemed to be no 
shortage of plans and specifications for what the City "should have done". The 
problem has been that the OWRB lacks the authority to enforce the timely 
implementation of its suggestions, without resorting to legal action. The OWRB did 
finally file a suit against the City, the IRDC, and Jim Corl, City Administrator, for 
failure to comply with the Board order to submit an Emergency Action Plan for the 
area below the Dam and spillway. The City did not have the funds to make the 
necessary repairs for many years, and when they did have the funds, they chose 
instead to invest in a new water supply source. The OSRC tried to help with 
negotiations, and threatened, or took, legal action when all other options were 
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exhausted. 
The administrative authority for managing the dam is fragmented. The 
OWRB, the City, the IRDC, and the OSRC, all have some kind of authority for 
either managing the Dam, or seeing that it is managed in a particular way. Each 
had their own management priorities, and they rarely agreed on management goals, 
and how to achieve them (see Chapter III). 
Consideration and Adjustment to Externalities 
The second criterion relates to the concept of river basin management. 
Although Lake Frances is not managed under a unified agency, management 
decisions affect the rest of the system. There are a number of questions relating to 
this aspect, beginning with, how was the externality (Lake Frances Dam) handled? 
In this case, the Lake Frances Dam is part of the Arkansas River hydrologic system. 
The Arkansas River Compact Commission has been involved with a pending 
change in the City's water rights, but they have no jurisdiction in the dam safety 
matter, since the dam is clearly located in Oklahoma. 
Who was responsible for the effects of management decisions of the Dam? 
The City was responsible, although there was no timely way to make them 
compensate for mismanagement of it. Were the affected parties considered in these 
decisions? The City seemed willing to listen to the concerns of the OSRC, and the 
OWRB. However, when it came down to acting upon them, the City consistently 
failed to follow through, and only acted when legally ordered to do so. For the 
OWRB' s part, when ever permits were considered for modification of the Dam, 
public hearings were held. Anyone could submit comments to the OWRB, and 
could attend the hearings. The OWRB also held a public meeting in Watts, during 
the Clean Lake Study, for the purpose of allowing citizens' input to influence the 
decision-making process. The OSRC was the foremost affected party involved in 
negotiating the desired outcomes, and representatives of it attended the hearings, 
Dam inspections, and City meetings when Lake Frances was discussed. 
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Were there legal and administrative requirements for considering the other 
parties? The City Board meetings were open to the public by law, but the Board 
was not required to notify affected parties when the Dam was on the agenda. The 
OWRB regulations require public hearings and, when there was a dispute involved, 
the affected parties were notified. 
Flexibility of Water Management Actions 
The third criterion seeks to answer the question of flexibility within the 
system. What degree of administrative discretion was provided in the law? There 
is a substantial amount of discretion within Oklahoma water management 
institutions, and consistently, the City took advantage of this. The City repeatedly 
missed deadlines for repairs to be made, which were set by the OWRB, and the 
OWRB was slow to respond at times. Within institutional systems, discretion can 
be used for positive outcomes. In this case, however, the discretion allowed 
noncompliance. 
To what extent are specific decisions constrained by administrative goals, 
policies and standards? The goals of each entity involved in this case are different. 
As discussed previously, the OWRB lacks strong capabilities to enforce the dam 
safety standards it sets, and it seemed reluctant to act quickly when the City was 
apathetic. This weakness has been at the root of the Dam controversy for many 
years, and the City has taken full advantage of it. The OWRB's reluctance to act 
possibly stemmed from the pending outcome of the Clean Lake Study, or the 
program demands of pursuing legal action. Possible causes for the City's apathy 
include a desire to save funds, an opinion that darn failure was not imminent, or 
that another water source would soon be utilized. 
To what extent can decisions be reassessed and adjusted over time? 
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Decisions were changed many times over the course of the years. For example, the 
severity and extent of the Darn safety was variable, depending upon which person 
was asked about it. Options for funding the reparation of the Darn were reassessed 
many times. Within the legal boundaries of the Oklahoma water management 
institution, the decisions made could, and were, widely adjusted. 
Consideration of a Range of Relevant Values 
The fourth criterion explores the institution's ability to express and consider 
the range of values relevant to a water, or in this case dam, management decision. 
Due to the stage at which Oklahoma operates, the first two aspects that Craine 
suggested of this criterion are not applicable here. Those two questions will not be 
considered in this case study. However, four of the aspects are relevant. 
First of all, formal interagency review procedures may provide linkages 
through which non-monetary values find expression in the decision-making 
process. During the history of the Lake Frances Dam, there were many 
opportunities to raise non-monetary issues. As noted earlier, the OWRB hearings 
were open to public participation, and public comments could be formally 
submitted. During the inspections of the Dam, the ODWC sent a biologist to assess 
the extent to which the management decisions being considered would significantly 
affect fish and wildlife resources. In this case, no significant effects were found. If 
there were problems, the ODWC would submit fonnal comments to the OWRB, 
which would be considered in management decisions. 
The process of obtaining a FERC permit for a hydroelectric project was an 
interagency process. The OWRB and the OSRC submitted fonnal comments to 
FERC, citing environmental concerns. The OSRC also brought up the fact that 
FERC must produce an environmental impact statement pursuant to the National 
Environmental Protection Act (42 U.S.C. § 4332, 18 C.F.R. § 380.6), which they did. 
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Another good example of raising a non-monetary issue came when the City 
was considering draining the Lake to make repairs to the water intake valve. The 
OSRC was concerned that the draining would destroy spawning fish populations in 
the Lake and River. The ODWC provided the expert witness confirming this point. 
The OSRC also believed the draining would destroy the integrity of the Clean Lake 
Study being done at that time. As a result of these two non-monetary beliefs, and 
other reasons, the OSRC passed a resolution asking the City to postpone the 
draining of the Lake (see chronology). The City postponed the action. These 
examples seemed to suggest that non-monetary values are adequately considered 
across agency lines, and acted upon in some cases. 
Secondly, the nature of representation provided on a governing board is a 
vital aspect in assuring that all relevant interests participate in decisions. Lake 
Frances has no singular governing board, so the governing boards of the primary 
entities will be explained here. All OWRB personnel are paid officials, and City 
officials are either elected or appointed from local residents. 
The composition of the OSRC is a bit more complicated. The Commission 
consists of twelve members. The Governor appoints three members, one of which 
must be a representative of the Oklahoma Conservation Commission, or the 
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Oklahoma Tourism and Recreation Commission. The President Pro Tempore of the 
Oklahoma State Senate appoints two members, one of which must be a member of 
a statewide citizens' conservation or environmental group. The Speaker of the 
Oklahoma House of Representatives appoints two members, one of which must be 
a resident of one of the counties containing the scenic river area. The additional 
members are elected in a nonpartisan election to represent the registered voters 
who reside or own property within the territorial jurisdiction of the Commission. 
The elected persons represent the county in which they live or own property. This 
provision allows non-resident property owners to participate in decisions. Two at-
large members are elected at the same time (OSRC 1989, 5). 
In contrast with Craine's stance on the degree of importance of this aspect, if 
a party is truly interested in either an issue, or one of these entities, there are ways 
to have input other than being on the governing boards. The OWRB allows public 
participation in all matters requiring permits. The elected City officials can be 
replaced if the decisions they are making are unsatisfactory, or a person can 
participate on a citizens' advisory committee to the City on a particular issue. As 
noted above, the OSRC elects two members at-large, providing the opportunity for 
concerned parties, who do not live in the area, the chance to have input to 
decisions. 
Thirdly, the rules by which decisions within agencies are made are 
important in determining whether values are properly considered in decisions. As 
noted in Chapter Ill, each entity involved with this case has its own management 
goals. Neither the OSRC or the City have rules stipulating consideration of any 
goals other than its own. This is not to say that neither of them did this. The 
OWRB has a wider range of goals, simply because it is responsible for the waters of 
the entire state, and although the City has recorded the primary use of Lake 
Frances as a municipal water supply, the OWRB considered many values when 
making decisions regarding the Dam or Lake. In this case, the OWRB had 
jurisdiction to make the final decisions regarding the dam. This allowed for the 
proper consideration of values. 
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Last of all, in many instances, requirements for consultations in formulating 
proposals and provisions for appeals and hearings may be the last resort for an 
individual or group seeking to be sure that its point of view and value are given 
consideration. As established previously, there were many opportunities for 
concerned parties to indicate their point of view. This aspect was not a problem in 
this case. 
Efficient Water Management Financing 
The fifth criterion seeks to answer whether or not the entities of the 
institution have the ability to finance water management consistent with its 
objective of efficiency. Two questions will be discussed in answer to this criterion. 
Were there any unusual obstacles to raising capital and operating funds? 
Herein lies the main problem of this case. For many years, Siloam Springs could 
not afford to repair the dam. The city is located in an economically depressed area 
where commonplace fundraising efforts were unsuccessful. The income level and 
property tax base is low. They tried to sell Lake Frances to Oklahoma for $1. They 
tried to develop a hydroelectric project, and so far, it has failed, too. Another failed 
attempt for funding came when Oklahoma's State Senator and State Representative 
for the area arranged for special appropriations to be made to the OSRC. These 
appropriations were to be given to the City to make repairs, realizing that it would 
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benefit the OSRC also. The special funds were not given to the City, but used 
within the OSRC instead (see chronology). The problem could also have been 
solved when the City was willing to sell the Lake, if the OWRB could have afforded 
to purchase it. The cost of dam repair for the benefit of a private user was 
considered, but the option to buy was decided against. The desired outcome by the 
OWRB was for the City to make the repairs, and OWRB regulations have no 
provision to help fund repairs when the owner cannot afford to do so. 
What is the extent to which disconformities in the incidence of costs and the 
incidence of benefits encourage inefficiencies? Although it is difficult to specify the 
extent to which this is true, it is safe to say that safety of the Lake Frances Dam is 
such a small part of the OWRB's responsibilities, that it could afford to overlook 
this inefficiency. Also, because of ongoing conflicts concerning water rights and 
water quality, the dam safety issue is only one part of the whole problem. 
Pursuing legal action is costly, with very little benefit in this case. 
Government as a Continuing Function 
The last criterion covers the extent to which water management is 
recognized and built into government as a continuing function. For example, were 
there any ad hoc arrangements, or were there any procedures for relating Dam 
management decisions to other relevant governmental policies and operations? In 
attempting to manage Lake Frances, the OSRC and the OWRB worked together at 
times. The OSRC also made several attempts at working with the City. This 
endeavor was rarely successful, so no coherent arrangement was formed. 
In the matter of relating Dam management decisions to other 
relevant governmental policies and operations, it would appear that the Lake 
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Frances Dam controversy was a useful example. Throughout the Dam's history, 
many private as well as local, state, and federal government agencies were 
involved, and all procedures for working together were followed. Chapter III offers 
an outline of all the entities playing parts, both big and small, and the chronology 
notes many instances where integrated management techniques were followed. 
CHAPTERV 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY 
Discussion of the Results 
This discussion will cover two topics, the results of the case study, followed 
by the results of how well the model dealt with the problem. The quality and 
composition of the administrative authority was addressed using the first criterion. 
The administration of authority over the Lake Frances Dam was found to be 
fragmented, augmenting the continued disrepair of the Dam. Each of the entities 
had different management goals, which also contributed to the problem. 
Two more administrative problems surfaced, which speak to the quality of 
administrative authority. First was the OWRB's inability to enforce its standards. 
This was not a legislative problem, because the OWRB ultimately had legal 
authority over the City. However, administrative processes within the OWRB were 
what allowed the disrepair of the Dam to exist for so long. If the OWRB had 
administrative authority to order dam safety repairs, and assess fines for 
noncompliance, the Lake Frances Dam would never have failed. 
There are many other municipal dams in Oklahoma that have been in 
noncompliance, but usually the owners have made repairs without a Court order 
being issued. The Lake Frances Dam is unique in that it is located within the 
OWRB jurisdiction, but is operated from Arkansas. The ongoing water rights and 
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water quality problems contributed to the contrary nature of the City officials. 
Since the end of the chronology of this case study, the City repaired and modified 
the dam to a small structure, low hazard classification (see Appendix A), and 
obtained a Corps permit to move the water intake valve upstream. These actions 
eliminated the dam safety and water rights issues, and partially solved the water 
quality issue. 
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The second problem was the limit of options available to the OWRB when 
the private owners of a small dam cannot afford to make repairs. This leads to the 
financial aspect of the case. Herein lies the greatest problem. The City genuinely 
tried many times to find options for help in repairing the dam. These options were 
discussed in the fifth criterion analysis. The City did borrow the money to make 
repairs, and then decided against using the money for that purpose. The OWRB 
filed a lawsuit against the City to force the repairs, but the dam failed before any 
action was taken. The point is that the darn should have been repaired many years 
before the failure occurred. 
Concerning the legislative aspect, no major obstacles were uncovered during 
this analysis. As noted above, and in the chronology, the OWRB and the OSRC 
had legal alternatives and exercised them. The weakness was in the timeliness of 
the actions. However, since the conclusion of the chronology, Senator Rozell, and 
Representative Benson, wrote new legislation, creating the Oklahoma Dam Safety 
Act. Part of this new Act gives the OWRB the power to "impose administrative 
penalties to dam owners who fail, refuse or neglect to comply with the provisions" 
of the act. Previously, the OWRB was forced to pursue action in the State courts. 
This legislation was created, in part, due to the Lake Frances Darn controversy. 
Did the model enable all aspects of the case to be identified and considered? 
It did not. Emel and Peet addressed what could be a missing key element. They 
state that "efforts at resource management cannot be explained by depersonalizing 
the actors ... or by oversimplifying the policy-making and implementation process 
(1989, 57)." Certainly Craine's model allowed the policy-making and 
implementation process to be fully considered. However, in this case it was 
discovered that when key persons within a group had personality clashes, poor 
decisions followed. After many miscommunications between the City and the 
OSRC, the problem was addressed by the OSRC which suggested a retreat for the 
City officials and Commissioners to resolve the problems. Although the retreat 
never came about, at least an attempt was made. 
76 
This proves Dorcey's point, regardless of the potential effectiveness of the 
institutions, the success in handling problems will ultimately depend on the people 
in the process, and particularly on the manner in which they are able to interact 
with others (1986, 258). However, Mitchell states, and it seems true, that capable 
people can make things happen despite the system in which they work, and 
mediocre or incompetent individuals are unlikely to accomplish a great deal 
regardless of the adequacy of the institutional arrangements within which they 
function (1979, 259). 
Mitchell also notes that measurement of this aspect is difficult because many 
of the concepts relevant to this problem, such as values, customs, leadership, 
power, fragmentation, and influence, are difficult to operationalize (1979, 261-7). 
Also needed for analysis are explicit criteria and specific descriptions of which 
functions are being analyzed. 
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Institutional Recornrnenda tions 
The resolution of the Lake Frances Darn problem carne too late for it to be 
affected, but numerous researchers have shown the advantages of a regional water 
management system. To illustrate the necessary components of such an institution, 
Craine followed his 1969 study, with a study on institutions for managing lakes and 
bays. He states that delineating an institutional system for lake \bay management 
involves two interdependent considerations. The first concerns the role of various 
jurisdictions of general government-federal, state, counties, and municipalities-
particularly the kinds of intervention powers they may be motivated to enact. The 
second concerns the nature of a lake\bay agency, including the scope of powers 
delegated to it, its geographic jurisdiction, the operational linkages between it and 
other agencies and its organizational form. 
An essential difference exists between interstate compact commissions and 
river basin planning commissions. Disputes involving the former are solved in the 
court system, while the latter, if federally authorized, include mandatory dispute 
resolution procedures. Successful examples are the TV A, the Columbia River Basin 
Commission, Susquehanna River Basin Commission, and the Delaware River Basin 
Commission. 
The National Water Commission supported the idea of river basin planning, 
and although the NWC Report's thrust is on national institutional reform (Bromley, 
Butcher and Smith 1974, 16), perhaps the beginnings could come from the states 
involved in particular conflicts. For Lake Frances, this would mean a federally 
authorized Arkansas River Basin Authority. The Water Resource Commission has 
suggested that the needs of a basin should be determined, and the major outlines of 
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a basin-comprehensive plan for the conservation, development, and management of 
the basin should be clearly defined before any institutional change takes place. The 
NWC also noted that any existing agencies that would be adequate for the newly 
defined functions should be utilized before creating a new entity within the 
arrangement. In this case, perhaps the Arkansas River Compact Commission could 
expand its management functions and goals to incorporate more than water rights. 
To fund these kinds of projects the NWC made a recommendation for the 
Water Resources Council to have appropriations for land use and river basin 
planning, as well as planning grants to states (Bromley, Butcher, and Smith 1974, 
16). 
Aside from institutional reform, another option could be considered. To 
prevent similar cases, the owner of a high hazard dam could be required to post a 
bond with the State, sufficient to cover the cost of removing the hazard posed by 
the dam, and dedicated for that purpose, should the owner abandon the structure. 
This suggestion would be an extremely low cost alternative for the OWRB. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
This case study was done to test one framework of analysis for an 
institutional arrangement. Many case studies have to be done before theories can 
be developed for the field. As discussed in the literature review, one of the 
primary problems of institutional arrangement studies is that they do not use the 
same definitions and criteria for analysis. However, a definition can be refined, or 
a criterion added, to improve the model, without impairing the integrity of the 
model. 
The model needs a seventh criterion addressing the issue of personal factors 
impacting institutional decisions. The criterion would consist of four parts: 
(1) identifying the key players, 
(2) defining their roles and authority, 
(3) identifying. communication problems, and 
(4) defining barriers to dispute resolutions. 
This addition to the model needs to be included in subsequent case studies, in 
order to develop an accurate theory of institutional arrangement studies. 
Summary 
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In summary, the analysis produced the following conclusions. The 
administration of authority over the Lake Frances Dam was found to be 
fragmented, augmenting the continued disrepair of the Dam. The administrative 
processes within the OWRB were what allowed the disrepair of the Dam to exist for 
so long. The OWRB has a limited number of options when the private owners of a 
small dam cannot afford to make repairs. Finally, the analysis of personality 
conflicts restricting communications of the involved parties was not included in the 
model. 
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SIZE CLASSIFICATION MAXIMUM STORAGE (Ac-Ft) MAXIMUM HEIGHT (Ft) 
Small 
Intermediate 
Large 
less than 10,000 
between 10,000 and 50,000 
over 50,000 
and less than 50 
or between 50 and 100 
or over 100 
CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARD POTENTIAL 
EXTENT OF DOWNSTREAM DEVELOPMENT 
CATEGORY LOSS OF LIFE ECONOMIC LOSS 
Low 
Significant 
High 
None (No probable future 
development; may be zoned 
to prevent future 
development) 
None (Potential for future 
development exists; 
habitable structures may 
exist in inflow design flood 
floodplain, however, dam 
failure would not endanger 
lives that would not be 
endangered if structure did 
not exist) 
Yes (One or more habitable 
structures with loss of life 
due to dam failure likely) 
More than a few (Rural 
communities and/ or 
developments) 
Minimal (Undeveloped to occasional 
structure or agriculture) 
Appreciable (Notable agricultural, 
industrial or structural) 
Excessive (Extensive community, 
industrial or agricultural) 
APPENDIX B 
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IN T'B! DISTRICT COORT ~ AND FOR ADAIR COONTT 
STATE OF OlLABO«A 
TR£ O~LAROHA WATER RESOURCES ) 
BOARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) No. C-89-1 !J6 , 
THE ILLINOIS UV£R DE:V£LOPM£NT ) 
CO. and THE CITY OF SILOAM ) 
SPRINGS, AR~ANSAS, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER 
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On this 2nd day of November, 1989, the above-styled and 
numbered cause comes on for hearing. Plaintiff is represented by 
its attorney, Lou Klaver, and defendants are represented by their 
attorney, Rex Earl Starr. After hearing oral argument froa 
counsel and reviewing the petition and administrative order filed 
herein, this Court finds as followsz 
1. Plaintiff, an administrative agency of the State, issued 
an order on December 13, 1988, which included findings that Lake 
Frances Daa and Spillway ia in an unsafe condition and ordered 
defendants to initiate and complete certain remedial measure• to 
bring the vorka into a safe condition. These corrective aeasurea 
were to be completed by October 1, 1989. 
2. Defendants attempted to appeal the adainiatrative 
order in the District Court of Adair County pursuant to ~itle 75 
.. 
• EXHIIIT I A 
o.s. 1981, 5318. Bovever, defendants failed to comply ~ith the 
statutory requirements set forth in that section and this Court 
dismissed the appeal. 
3. Defendants have never sought, and this Court has never 
issued, a stay of the Board's administrative order authorized and 
allowed pursuant to 7S o.s. 1981, $319. That provision makes it 
clear that seeking judicial review of an agency decision does not 
by itself stay enforcement of that decision, but rather the agency 
decision remains in full force and effect and must bt complied 
with unless or until a stay is requested and issued by the Court. 
4. Plaintiff inspected the subject works on October 2, 
1989, and found them to be in substantially the same unsafe 
condition 11 when the administrative order described in paragraph 
3 was issued. 
5. The defendants' failure to comply with the plaintiff'• 
order constitutes irreparable injury for which plaintiff has_no 
adequate re•edy except by Order and Injunction of thla Court 11 
.authori&ed by 12 o.s. 1981, SS1311 et seq., and 82 o.s. 1981, 
5105.20. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a temporary injunction 11 
hereby issued prohibiting defendants froa continuing in violation 
of the administrative order issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources 
Board on December 13, 1988, and incorporated by reference herein. 
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IT IS FORTRER ORDERED that defendants proceed i~ediattly to 
initiate of the remedial measures incorporated and ordtrtd herein. 
In recognition of the inconsistent weather patterns that exist at 
this time of the year, defendants shall proceed as expeditiously 
as possible with completion of the remedial measures and shall 
complete all remedial measures by July 1, 1990, unless othervise 
ordered by this Court. 
IT lS FURTHER ORDERED tbat defendants shall file with this 
Court a written status report at the end of each month setting 
forth in detail all actions taken with regard to bringing Lake 
Frances Dam and Spillway into a safe condition and in compliance 
with this Order. A copy of tbe monthly report shall also be 
provided by the defendants to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board. 
, 1989, 
' JUDGE or 'l'B£ DIS'l'RICT couar 
ADAIR COOHft 
BEfORE THE O~L~OMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD 
STAT£ OF O~L~OMA 
N TH£ ~~TT£R Of Lake Frances da" 
nd spillway owned and operated 
y the Illinois River Development 
ompany and the City of Siloam 
prings, Arkansas. Located in 
heW l/2 of Section 17, 19 N. l 
6 £, I.M. Adair County, Oklahoftla,) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS Of LAW AND BOARD ORDER 
This ~atter came on for individual hearing bt!ore the 
klaho•• Water Resources Board (•Board•) on August ll, 1988, on 
he above styled end captioned matter concerning the dam and 
p1llway works owned and operated by the Illinois River 
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~velopment Company and the City of Siloam Springs, Arkansas, the 
!me being an administrative hearing authorized and conducted 
nder 75 o.s. 1981, Sections 301 et aeq., as •~ended, and the 
~les, Regulations and Modes of Procedure of the Board. A hearing 
n the condltion of the Lake Frances dam and spillway was 
· :heduled and tht owner was given written notice of same by 
!rtified ma1l. Said hearing was scheduled for Auqust 11, 1988, 
t 10:30 a.m., in the Board's offices in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
Mr. Harold L. Springer, P.E., presided as hearing examiner 
'r the Board. The instant proceedings were duly opened and all 
trties were introduced for the record. Present from the Board 
!re C. Lou Klaver, Staff Attorney and Russell LaForce, $taff 
,gineer. Dean Couch was the hearing examiner'• legal advisor and 
surie Cornish was the recording secretary. Present for the City 
! Siloam Springs (•City•) were Rex Earl Starr, Attorney, Jia . 
)rl, City Administrator, Alan Fortenberry, Engineer from 
:Goodwin, Williams and Yatea, Inc. (•Kft~•), Dennla Daniela and 
)b Benry, of the Illinoia River Development Coapany. Othera 
~esent included Jerry Chastain and Marcus Ale~re from the Federal 
,ergy Regulatory Com~ission, Ed Fite from the Oklahoma Scenic 
tvers Commission, and Representative Larry Adair. Participating 
itnessea were duly sworn, instruments and exhibits were admitted, 
~ning remarks were entertained. Tbe hearing exaainer inquired 
1ether anyone objected to his serving as hearing examiner on this 
ltter since he had been involved vith this project in the past. 
> objections were aade. Board staff introduced several exhibit•. 
1e respondent's attorney requested additional tiae to review said 
,cument1. Respondent al1o requested the hearln~ exaalner make 1 
~eld inspection of the daa and spillway as 1 part of the 
·oceedings. 
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The hear1ng ~as cont1nued to August 25, 1988, at wh1ch t1~e 
an on-s1te .ins~ctlon of the dam and spllhl)' was ~ade. The 
hunng and the _ucord wue thtn rto~ntd lattr thit day It flint 
~1dge It arprox1~attly 3:30p.m. and proceedtd unt1l approx1mattly 
7:00 P·•· The hear1ng at that t 1 ~e was further cont1nued to 
Septtmbu ll, 1988, u 1:00 p. 11 • 1 n the off1cts of the Board in 
Oklahoma City, then rescheduled to November 15, 1988, at 1:00 p.a. 
at the offices ot tht Board in Oklahoma City. Additional exh1b1t1 
were introd~ced and testimony was g1ven.· The hearing was closed 
at approx1matel)' 4:00 p.m. wah the record being left open unt1l 
November 28, 1988, for the &ubmittal of photographs showing 
con~truct1on of the dam and splll~ay. The attorneys were g1ven 
unt1~ November 21, 1988, to submit propo&ed findings to the 
hear1ng exam1ner. 
FINDINGS OF fACT 
Based upon a review and consideration of all relevant 
docuDents, exhibJts, ev1dence and public rtcords, the Board t~akes, 
finds and determines the following Flndlngs o! ract, all being as 
&upporud by substantul and cozr.petent evidence ava1hble and 
appearing as p1rt of the record here1n: 
l. Lake Frances Dam and Spillway are locaUd in the w l/2 
of Sect1on 17, To~nship 19 ~orth, Rangt 26 East of Indian 
Meridian, Ada1r County, Oklahoma, on the Illinois River. The 
realty on which th~ dam lies is owned by the Illinois River 
u~vtlopm~nt tompany. The dam and 1p1llway are maintained by the 
C1 ty, and "'attr iJr.poundtd by the dam is used by the City for 
municipal use. 
2. Pertin~nt data related to Lake Frances Dam and Spillway 
i~ as follows: 
Drainage artar 635 &quare miles -. 
Top of dam elevation: 931.0 ft. MSL 
Spillway crest elevations 918.55 ft. MSL 
Auxiliary spillway crest elevations 918.80 ft. MSL 
Conservation pool storager 1,530 acre-feet 
Top of dam storagez J 585 acre-feet 
Type of dam: earthftl{ and concrete double arch 
Maximua height of daaa approximately 30 feet 
Regulating outlet: 54 1 Sf inch sluice gate 
Type of spillwayr concrete ogee weir 
Ma1n spillway length: 162 feet 
Auxiliary spillway length: 518. feet 
l. The initial planning and design of the dam and spillway 
was done by Victor B. Cochrane, consulting engineer, Tulsa, 
Oklaho••· The original project with some aodifications vaa 
completed in Ull. A failure of tl•t earth eabtnkment adjacent to 
the double concrtte arch vas reported in 1943. High flow 
exceeding the apillvay capacity apparently caused the daa to be 
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overlOfpE-C, ano a;:;:-rout.ately 100 teet C·f tht' emton~rt.ent 10ashtd 
out. Oet!lls of the fa1lurt do not 1nd:cate ~hether the dart ~•• 
lew 1n ttl~ arta and overtoppang thus caused the fallure, or 1! 
four.dJtlCn 1=-rct.Jt-rn:, p1p1ng or 6o:r.e otht-r prot.lem caustd tollur£-
durlng the hlSh pool at th1s loc~t1on. There was no 1ndicat1on of 
the type and u.ount of damage \t'hlct. occ~.:r nd as a rtsult of tht 
!allure. See Page 3, Phase 11 Report, Ml-'Y, June, 1987. 
4. In 1954, the City of Siloam Springs exprtssed intentions 
to rebu1ld the dam for use as a water supply. Plans for 
reconstruction of the tarth embankment ~tee prepared by Fell and 
Wheeler Consultlng Engineers, Tulsa, Oklahoma. Provisions for a 
small concrete cutoff wall and possibly a 200 foot 'ection of 
sheet p1l1ng adJacent to the double concrete arch were included in 
the plans to reduce the poss1b1lity of a recurring failure. Tht 
remaining port1on of the earth embankment was ra1sed 2.5 feet and 
extended approx1~ately 700 feet. See Page 3, Phase ll Report. 
5. On Ftbr ua ry 1 S, 197 8, Lake Frances du and spillway were 
ins~cted by the u.s. Army, Corps of £ng1neers CCOE> and the 
Oklahoma ftater Resources Board and accompanied by Dennis Daniels, 
Water Plant Su~rintendent for the City. A •phase I Report• 
detailing said inspection was prepared. The following is the 
br1et assessment of the proJect and reco~mended action set forth 
in the ~hase T ~eport: 
~Preliminary computations indicate the project can only pass 
approximately 20 percent of the PMF lprocable •aximum flood) 
w1thout overtOpflng the embankment. Under PHF and l/2 PMF 
conditions the embankment would be overtopped by 8.1 feet and 4.3 
feet of water, respectively. Overtopping of such ••gnitude would 
result in failure of the project, therefore, remedial measures 
would be required to assure the project can safely pass the design 
flood. • 
•seepage was observed downstream of the embankment on the 
left side of the spillway. Additional investigations will be 
necessary to further evaluate these conditions. 
•tngineering data indicate the possibility for differential 
settlement and cracking of the embankment within the area adjacent 
to the concrete arch da•. Additional investigations, including a 
stability analysis and visual inspection with the pool below the 
spillway crest, will be required.• 
Phase I Report, by the CO£ and Board, February, 1978. 
6. On April 26, 1978, a copy of the Phase I Report was 
transmitted to Kayor ~night of the City with a letter advising 
that the dam and spillway were inadequate. 
7. The Board sent the City additional letter' advi1ing and 
requesting action concerning deficiencies regarding Lake Frances 
da• and spillway on December 14, 1978, January 17, lt7t, July 16, 
1980, february 1, 1983; January 18, 1985, June 6,1986 and April 
28, 1988. 
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8. On October 19, 1984, the C1ty passt>d a rt>soluuon to 
repau Lake Frances darn and splll\iay, 1nd1cat1n9 that work to 
correct d~!1c1enc1es would be 1n1t1ated in Aprll 1985 and would be 
complet~d in January 1986. 
9. On february 19, 1985, Jack Hoyt, Clty Adm1n1strator for 
the C.ity, requested an extens 1 on of tune, to February 19, 1987, to 
f1le an appl1cat1on for a!Jproval of plans and specificatlons to 
~od1fy the dam and &flllway at Lake frances. 
10. On August 20, 1986, the Board r~ceived two copies of the 
draft Phase II Report for Lake frances Dam from Alan Fortenberry 
of Mh'Y. That draft Phase II Plans acknowledged de!icienc1es 1n 
the da~ and sp1llway and set forth recommended actions. 
11. On July 2, 1987, over ·tour months out of time, the Board 
received an application for approval of plans and specifications 
to repa1r and improve the earthen embankment of Lake Frances dam 
from the IlllnOlS ~iver Development Company. The f1nal Phase II 
Report by ~·y dated June 1987 "'"also includ~d. The add1t1onal 
inspection and Phase II Report constltutes, at least in part, the 
~addJtlonal 1nvest1gat1ons• required undtr the Phase I Report. 
See F1nd1ng of fact 5. 
12. The application, plans and specifications, and other 
matters were considered and approved by the Board on January 12, 
1988. 
Ca> The pl~ns and spec1fications addressed several 
items, including: 
li> Embankment protection, including establishment of ot 
vegetation, addition of rip rap with proper bedding 
~aterial and filter blanket, 
<ii) Grading the crest of the dam to make it level. 
(iii) Filling and compacting a low area on the north end of 
the embankment. 
Cb) The hazard potential classification was changed from 
•high• to •significant•, thereby decreasing the percent of PMF 
required to be passed by the apillway. 
Cc) A warning and evacuation plan was ordered to be updated, 
submitted to the Adair County Civil Defense and Oklahoma Scenic 
River Commission for approval, then submitted to the Board. 
Cd> The Board's order did not specify when the work on the 
earthen embankment was to begin or to be completed. 
Ce) The Board's order was not appealed. 
1). Rt-y.Hdlng, the eortt.cr. ('ITt·ont.n.(·nt, the Board !1nd: a!> 
follo-·~: 
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(a) J..~ of the dat~ of the HearJ-ng txarT.lr.er's personal 
on-site lnS?t-ctlor., th~ tr~t-s and v~getat1on along tt.e err.t;.ank.m~nt 
extendlng south from the concrett' Sflll~ay approx1~ately 2000 feet 
~ave been cleartd, and a substantlal ~ount oC grad1ng and 
earthwork hu taken place. A ftw animal burrow holes remain. Rip 
rap has not been added to the upstream nor the do...,nstream side. 
The top of the emtank~ent has not been prec1sely leveled. The 
C1ty lntends to place Compacted flll on the top of the e~bank~ent 
and establlsh grass type vegetat1on on the downstr~~ slope to 
prt'vent t'ros1on. rootpaths vary1ng 1n w1dth and depth ex1st along 
the downstream Slde of the embankment near the concrete part of 
the dam. Such paths could lead to further and more severe eros1on 
from heavy r11nfall ~vents or i~ case of overtopping. Erosion 
from overtopping could also occur if the crest of the embankment 
is not level, thus resulting in isolated !low patterns or from 
e•ch·atu ccnd1t1ons. The downstream toe of tt.e dam would be 
partJcularly vulnerable under such cond1tion. 
Cbl P1ezo~eter wells have been installed in five loc•tions 
on the earthen embankment to obtain groundwater ~~for~ation. At 
the ~ugust 1988 on-slte lnspection, th~ Hearing £xam1ner saw one 
such well rude of PVC pi~. It had been sever~d at the ground 
surface on the crest of the tmbank~ent approxi~ately 1000 feet 
from the concrete portion of the dam. No other piezometers wert 
located. Ptrmane~t markers or protection barriers were not in 
place so that ~aintenanc~ machinery could avoid them or so that 
they could be located ~asily for monitoring and me~suring the 
w~t~r l~v~l th~reln. 
Ccl A spec1fic time frame for comp1~tion of remed~al work on 
th~ earthen err.bankment was not provided by the City. 
14. Regarding the concret~ portion of the dam, including the 
main spillway, the Board finds as followar 
Ca> The total spillway capacity is approximately 113,000 
cubic feet per s~cond when the lake elevation is at 931.0 f~et, 
which is approximately twenty (20) percent of the PMf flow. 
Cb) A horizontal crack in the main spillway at th~ 
approximate elevation of 909 feet exists. It allows water to pass 
through the concr~te which forms the main spillway. The crack is 
approximately 4 inches wid~ on the upstre~ sid~, and is 
approximately 75 feet long and extends horizontally to the right 
of center of the spillway. The Board finda that the concrete 
above the crack does not have a significant probability of 
slipping or being lost, therefore anchors do not need to bt 
inserted. Bowever, water flowing through the crack and the 
potential freeze and thaw cycle damage to concrete weakens the 
concrete and creates additional risk of failure over tim~. 
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Th~r~for~, the crack must be repatred by plactng epoly grout or 
oth~r substance d~~m~d approprtate by acceptable eng1neer1n9 
practices into the crack to seal 1t. 'fht sealtng treaunent must 
ll~ 1ns~cted annually before Septembu 1 of each yur, and !urthtr 
tceatroent appJJtd as necessary to ~a1nta1n the seal. 
fc) Tht double arch concrete portion of the dam contains 
Jninor scaling, spaling, cracks and leaks, wlth one leak flowJng 
approx1aately 1 gallon per m1nute when the water elevation is at 
the top or near the top of the ~nain &plllway. Said scaling and 
leaks ~taken the concrete structure end increase potenttal for 
failure. Therefore, concrete repair work on th1s portion of the 
dam must be completed. 
Cdl There is one gate to allow water to pass from the lake 
through the ma1n spillway downstream to the Illinois ~iver. The 
gate was operated during the August 1988 on-s1te visit by an 
e.lectric Jnotor s•Hched from a uttlity pole approximately 700 feet 
from the 111a1n sptllway. The gate closing was slow, tak1ng 
approxi~ately 10 ~inutes to decrease the flow of water 
approx1~ately 10 percent. The water level on the date of the 
inspection was approor:-.ately 10 feet below tht top of tht main 
Spllhay crest. 
Ce> There are water boils or seeps coming from the rock 
foundation under the auxtliary spillway. The Board finds that 
there is a high probabllity that the water passes through the rock 
in natural channels. The boils or seeps should be monitored 
rout1nely for 1ndication of increased turbidity or drAmatic 
increase in flow, wh1ch could indicate foundation problems. 
lS. The Board finds that acceptable engineering and dam 
safety practices include preparation, i~plementation and updating 
of an operation and maintenance (0 ' H) plan for dams. •The plan 
addressed and referred to in the Phase II Report should be revised 
to include annual inspection and ~naintenance of the horizontal 
crack seal in the main sptllway discussed in Finding of Fact 14 
above. The 0 ' M plan should also be revised to include annual 
review, by September l,of each year, of the Emergency Action 
Warn1ng and Evacuation Plan. The 0 ' M plan should then be 
adopted, implemented immediately and reviewed at least annually. 
16. ~he City has considered and approved 1 bond sale of over 
Two Million Dollars for municipal improve~ents, with approximately 
1400,000 of that amount to be used for repaira to Lake Frances. 
The Bond sale has not taken place and probably will not until 
after January 1, 1989. Tht City is also considering alternative 
water supply sources and dam sites. 
17. The City did not provide an anticipated time schedule 
for initiation and completion of remedial ~easures. 
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CONCLUSJC'.•;~ Of l.A\o\ 
T~e Board ~akes and ~nters the follow1ng Conclus1ons of Law: 
l. The Board posstsses ade~uate jurlSOlCtlon and author1ty 
to enttrta1~ and ad)ud1cat~ tht in~tant matter pursuant to 82 o.s. 
1981, Sl05.27, as uended, and 82 o.s. 1981, Sl085.2, AS amt-ndtd. 
2. Notice of the instant procttdings was due and pro~r and 
the hear1ngs and proceed1ngs held were proper and in accord Wlth 
82 O.S. 1981, §1085.10, 75 o.s. 1981. Sl09 et seq., as u.ended, 
and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
3. The Board concludes that any dam and &pillway which does 
not meet the m1n1mum spillway capacity require~ents 5tt forth in 
the Board's rules, or which conta1ns deficiencies or conditions 
that do not meet acceptatle eng1neer1ng practlcts regard1n9 
constructlon, operat1on and ma1nt~nance of a dam and splllway, is 
cons1oered unsafe and a menace to life and property and needs to 
be put in a uft condaion, as requHed by 82 o.s. 1981, Sl05.27, 
as amended. The Board concludes that the Lake frances dam and 
sp1ll~ay in its current cond1tion is unsafe and a menace to l1fe 
and property. 
(a) Under Board rules, the minimUJII design capacity 
r~quirement applicable to Lake Frances Csmall size, aignificant 
hazard classiflcation> is to pass 40' of the PMF. See Board Rule 
7 2 0 .l (.) • ----
(b) Deficitnc1es and conditions of the Lake Frances 
dam and spillway that do not ~eet acceptable engineering practices 
for dam safety include without limitation the current condition of 
the earthen embankment (see Finding of Fact 13), the c~rrent 
condition of the ~a1n spillway and double arch portion of the dam 
(see Finding of Fact 14), the current condition of the 
piezometers (see Finding of Fact 13>, and the adoption and 
imple~entation of an adequate 0 ' M plan (see Finding of Fact 
15). 
4. The Board therefore concludes that certain changes are 
necessary and a reasonable time shall be provided foe putting the 
~ake Frances da• and apillway in a condition that meets Board 
rules and acceptable engineering practice• regarding the 
:onstruction , operation and ~aintenance of a dam and spillway. 
~ 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that tht City of Siloam Springs and 
llinois River Development Corporation shall initiate and complete 
he following measures and actions within the dates aet forth: 
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l. Corr.plE-tt- ._·on., construcuon anci rt.t-osuct-! on u.t- ~uthe-n 
t·n.!J,H,•:n.lnt, b:. J:iiOVJJl'J ltJ Lt.~: "lean~ an<.J s~C'lllcallvnl> anrovt-d 
t..:,- the Board on Jan~Joory 12, 1988. by October 1, 19&9. Tt.• work, 
co~structJon and oCtlVltles 1ncl~de ~lthout limitat1on t~e 
lt-ve-lH•S cf tt.t- crttt, tt.e co~t.flHlon o! euth ~on. on tt.t 
do ... nsta.t.:- slOf<C!' 1ncluc1nc: rer.-.oval of ell an11Ul burro._·~ and 
foot~atts, and t~e establishment of vegetat1on cover to prevent 
t-rosJon, lnltUtlon and complet1on o! np rap work, repau of the 
pitZOII•ete~s and installation of 111arkers for piezort.t-ters, and 
~e-asures to proh1b1t the dr1v1n9 of veh1clea on the slopes of the 
en.tankmt- r.t. 
2. F!e9ardin9 tt.e concrete portion of the dam, rest-vndents 
shall: 
Cal Initiate repairs to stal tht crack in the main sp1ll~ay 
by May 1, 1989 and cornpltte said repairs by October l, l9e9. 
<b> ln1t1ate repa1rs to cracks in concrete wall form1ng the 
douclt uct. f'Ortlon of du. by Hay 1, 1969 and cort:plete u1d 
ref.!lrS b}' Octct.u l, 198~. 
3. Rt-;ard1ng tt.e Opuat1on and Ma1ntenance Flan and 
rr.a:r.tenance 1tems to be cerried out: 
Cal The ~Proposed Operation and Maintenance Guidelines,• 
found on page C-6 and following of the •Report of Investigation 
wah Phns and Speclfications for Remedial Measures~ by McCooch•ln, 
~illius and Yates, Inc., January, 1985, hereafttr 0' M 
Gu1d~l1nes, should be revised to include an annual ins~ction and 
~a1ntenance of the seal to the crack in the main spill~ay as 
requirtd in Paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) The 0' M Guidelines shall also be revised to,include a 
require~ent to monitor the piezometer wells monthly and ketp 
currtnt written records on the results of such ~onitorin9 to be 
1ncluded in the written report as set forth below. 
(c) The 0 ' M Guidelines shall also be revised to include a 
requirement that the Emergency Action Warning and !vecuation 
Plan be reviewed At least annually and revised AI necessary. 
(d) The 0 ' M Guidelines as revised shall be adopted and 
imple~ented i~ediately, and ahall be reviewed at least 
annually and further revised as necessary. An updated copy 
of the 0' M Guidelines shall be submitted to the Board. 
(t) A written report detailing the results of the annual 
insptction of the seal and other components of the dam shall be 
submitted to the Board in the format as set forth in the· 
attachments to the 0' M Guidelines or such other format deemed 
appropriate by Respondents and that contains information 
substantially aimilar to that found in the ettachments. 
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DC;~ 1r. fP:;~!U anc op~r. l!d~lr.g C! tr.t C•Ja·o~.b \o.'ttfr 
F.es.ourct~ &"'.:ro on tnt ~c.:.: or !)-..-.;;:=;~; , lS_ti. 
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